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ABSTRACT
This dissertation argues that there are important asymmetries across industries
with regard to their role in international trade and economic growth. In the first
chapter, I develop a model of growth and trade that operationalizes the idea that the
amount of learning diffusion across industries depends on how similar the industries
are to each other. Growth in the model arises from occupational learning-by-doing,
which partially diffuses across industries. This induces a particular network structure
among industries, as a function of their occupational similarity. The model predicts
that countries with comparative advantages in industries that are more central in this
network will grow more in the aggregate.
In Chapter 2 I document a novel empirical finding consistent with the theory
developed in Chapter 1: a country’s growth in comparative advantage in an industry is
positively associated with its initial level of comparative advantage in occupationally
similar industries. Motivated by this, I use the observed dynamics in comparative
advantage, in combination with the structure of the model from Chapter 1, to back out
the model-implied amount of occupational learning and the extent to which learning
diffuses across industries. Compared to intra-industry learning, I find that cross-
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industry learning diffusion explains at least four times as much of the dynamics of
comparative advantage, as well as 38 percent of the average industry’s contribution
to aggregate growth.
The third chapter addresses the question of why industrialization tends to move
from country to country, with one country industrializing as another de-industrializes,
rather than many countries industrializing simultaneously. I show how a simple three-
sector model of trade, growth, and structural change can rationalize this pattern. Due
to non-homothetic preferences, as one country’s income increases from industrializa-
tion, its demand shifts to services. Since services are less tradable, the country’s
production also shifts to services, and it starts importing manufactured goods from
poorer countries. But due to increasing returns to scale in manufacturing, this in-
dustrialization is concentrated in only a subset of those poorer countries; the others
will not industrialize until the currently industrializing countries become sufficiently
wealthy themselves.
vii
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1Chapter 1
The Diffusion of Occupational Learning
Across Industries: Theory
1.1 Introduction
Which industries contribute the most to aggregate economic growth? In order to
address this question, one must account not only for growth in each industry’s own
value added, but also technological spillovers across industries. In this chapter I
operationalize the idea that the size of technological spillovers from one industry to
another depends on how similar the two industries are to each other, in the tasks
and skills needed to produce in those industries.
I do this by focusing on one particular, easily quantifiable dimension of similarity
in skills and tasks, namely, the occupational dimension. I develop a unified model of
trade and growth, in which the cross-sectional trade structure of the model follows
Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012), a multi-industry extension of the multi-
country model of Eaton and Kortum (2002). The source of growth in the model is
occupation-specific learning-by-doing, which partially diffuses across workers in an
occupation working in different industries. For example, since the automobile and
airplane manufacturing industries employ more engineers than economists, but vice
versa for the finance industry, then extra production of automobiles − and the re-
sulting large increase in learning-by-doing among engineers, but smaller increase in
learning-by-doing among economists − lowers future costs of production in the air-
2plane manufacturing industry more than the finance industry. This is captured in the
model through a parsimonious two-parameter formulation, with one parameter gov-
erning the overall amount of learning, and the other parameter governing the extent
to which this learning diffuses across industries. These parameters, in combination
with the intensity with which each industry uses each occupation, govern the extent
to which learning in each particular industry diffuses into each other industry.
I use the model to show that occupational learning has important implications
for aggregate growth. In particular, the model endogenously generates a particular
network structure of inter-industry learning spillovers, as a function of occupational
similarity across industries. The model predicts that countries with comparative
advantages in industries that are more central in this network will grow more in
the aggregate. In chapter 2 I will go on to show that this effect is quantitatively
significant.
This chapter contributes to several strands of literature. The mechanism under-
lying the model is related to the spatial economics literature that finds that occupa-
tional similarity plays a significant role in explaining the geographic co-agglomeration
of industries. This was first explored in a static setting by Ellison, Glaeser, and
Kerr (2010), using cross-sectional data from the US at the metropolitan, county, and
state levels. Hanlon and Miscio (2016) examine the dynamics of these industrial co-
agglomeration patterns using city-level panel data from the UK. These papers focus
on estimating the reduced-form effect of occupational similarity on co-agglomeration
across pairs of industries. In this chapter I develop a model of economic growth that
offers a theoretical rationale for why occupational similarity is an important channel
through which growth in one industry spurs growth in another. The model allows
me to expand on previous contributions by examining not just the effects of growth
in one industry on another industry, but the equilibrium effects on aggregate growth,
3in both a closed and an open economy.
At the heart of my model is the notion of economic growth through learning-
by-doing, which dates back to Arrow (1962). The first to analyze this within a
multi-industry framework were Clemhout and Wan (1970) and Bardhan (1971), who
showed that if certain industries exhibit more learning-by-doing than others, and
if learning is external to individual firms, then this gives theoretical (although not
necessarily practical) justification for subsidizing the industries with more learning.
Lucas (1988), Young (1991), Matsuyama (1992), and Galor and Mountford (2008)
theoretically show that these considerations are further amplified by international
trade: if certain countries have a comparative advantage in high-growth industries
(i.e., industries with large learning-by-doing externalities) while other countries have
a comparative advantage in low-growth industries, then the dynamic gains from trade
will be higher for the former countries than for the latter countries. I draw on this
literature to inform the choice of functional form for the learning-by-doing function.
To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to analyze occupation-specific learning-
by-doing and its implications for cross-industry learning spillovers.
The inter-industry learning spillovers that endogenously result from my model
connect this chapter with a recently flourishing literature on the macroeconomic im-
plications of network structures among industries. This literature, which has given
particularly extensive attention to the input-output structure of the economy, dates
back to Hirschman (1958), who influentially argued that economic development in one
sector induces development in other sectors that either use, or are used by, that sector
as an input (“forward” and “backward” linkages, respectively). This view of the devel-
opment process was formalized by Rodriguez-Clare (1996a and 1996b). Jones (2011)
develops a static model in which forward and backward linkages amplify the effects of
exogenous sector-specific distortions on aggregate total factor productivity, using US
4input-output data for illustration. Oberfield (2013) develops a model in which the
input-output structure of the economy arises endogenously from firms searching for
the lowest-cost suppliers of inputs; low-cost suppliers endogenously emerge as “star
suppliers,” providing inputs for many other firms and playing an important role in
propagating cost savings throughout the economy. The implications of the input-
output structure of the economy for volatility and business cycles were explored in
Long and Plosser (1983), and more recently Carvalho (2010) and Acemoglu et al
(2012).
Note, however, that the network of industries in this chapter is not based on
input-output linkages. While input-output linkages are an important channel through
which shocks and distortions are transmitted across industries, they are not, in and of
themselves, a source of growth.1 In contrast, the occupational learning spillovers that
are the source of the inter-industry network structure in this chapter are indeed, in
and of themselves, a source of endogenous long-run growth. The focus of this chapter
on similarity across industries in their required skills and knowhow complements
the work of Hidalgo, Klinger, Barabasi, and Hausmann (2007), who use observed
overlap in the countries that export each product to estimate an underlying network
of products (which they call the “product space”) that represents overlap in the
capabilities required to produce products. They offer evidence that when countries
branch out into new products, they do so by moving into products that are near their
old products in this network.
The difference between the network of input-output linkages and the network
of industries based on occupational similarity can be seen in Figures 1·1 and 1·2,
respectively. As these figures illustrate, the topology of the network of industries
based on occupational similarity (the subject of this chapter) is significantly different
from that of the network of input-output linkages.
1This same point is made by Hanlon and Miscio (2016).
5The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I introduce and
analyze the model in the context of a closed economy. In section 1.3 I extend the
analysis into a multi-country framework. Section 1.4 concludes.
Figure 1·1: The input-output structure of the US manufacturing sec-
tor
Note: this figure was generated using the 2013 US Direct Requirements input-output table from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, at the three-digit NAICS level of aggregation (comprising 20
industries). The (h, i) element of the Direct Requirements table is the number of dollars worth of
intermediate input h used to make one dollar’s worth of output in industry i. For each pair of
industries h and i, if the (h, i) element in the Direct Requirements table is above the 60th percentile
of entries, then a line is drawn in this figure between industries h and i.
6Figure 1·2: Network structure of US manufacturing sector based on
occupational similarity
Note: this figure was generated using 2013 US data on each industry’s employment of each occu-
pation, from the Occupational Employment Statistics program at the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Industries are classified by their three-digit NAICS codes, and occupations are classified by their
two-digit SOC (Standard Occupational Classification) codes. The figure is based on the matrix
whose (h, i) element is the correlation coefficient between the industry-h vector of employment of
each occupation (as a fraction of industry h’s total employment) and the corresponding industry-i
vector. For each pair of industries h and i, if the (h, i) element in this matrix is above the 60th
percentile of entries, then a line is drawn in this figure between industries h and i.
1.2 Closed-economy model
I model an economy with multiple industries and multiple occupations. To fix ideas,
consider the following three industries and two occupations: automobile manufactur-
7ing, airplane manufacturing, and finance; and engineers and economists. There is
learning-by-doing within each occupation, which spills over to everyone in the occu-
pation regardless of the industry for which they are working.
Consider, then, what happens if production increases in the car industry. Since
the car industry employs a large number of engineers but only a small number of
economists, this will cause a significant increase in learning-by-doing among engi-
neers, not so much among economists. The extent to which this benefits another
industry corresponds to how much that other industry is engineer-intensive rather
than economist-intensive − in particular, it will lower the cost of production in the
airplane manufacturing industry more than the finance industry, since the former is
engineer-intensive while the latter is economist-intensive.
We can then think of industries as forming a network, where, for any two indus-
tries, the strength of the link between them corresponds to how similar they are in
their intensity of usage of different occupations. As we will see in the analysis that
follows, an industry that is more central in this network will generate more learning
spillovers and thereby contribute more to aggregate economic growth.
1.2.1 The economic environment
Consider a closed economy with I industries2, indexed by i ; J occupations, indexed
by j ; and an arbitrary number of discrete time periods, indexed by t.
The representative household in this economy has a CES utility function over its
consumption of each good:
Ut = (
∑
i
βiC
γ−1
γ
it )
γ
γ−1 (1.1)
where Ut is the representative household’s utility at date t, Cit is its consumption
2I will use the terms “industry” and “good” interchangeably.
8of good i at date t, βi is an exogenous parameter governing the intensity of the
household’s preference for good i, and γ is the hosehold’s elasticity of substitution
across the different goods.
At each date t, the representative household chooses {Cit}i to maximize Ut subject
to its budget constraint:
∑
i
PitCit = wtLt (1.2)
where Pit is the price of good i at date t; wt is the wage at date t; and Lt is the
household’s exogenous endowment of labor at date t, which it supplies inelastically.
The representative firm in industry i produces its good using labor from each oc-
cupation, according to a production function that is CES with respect to the different
occupations:
Yit = [
∑
j
αij(φijtLijt)
−1
 ]

−1 (1.3)
where Yit is output in industry i at date t, Lijt is employment of occupation j
in industry i at date t (in units of raw labor), φijt is productivity in occupation j
in industry i at date t (which evolves over time from learning-by-doing, as explained
below), αij is an exogenous parameter governing the intensity with which industry i
uses occupation j, and  is the elasticity of substitution across occupations (which,
for tractability, is assumed to be constant across industries).
At each date t and in each industry i, the industry-i representative firm chooses
{Lijt}j to maximize its profit piit:
piit = PitYit −
∑
j
wtLijt (1.4)
At each date t, labor markets must clear:
9∑
i
∑
j
Lijt = Lt (1.5)
as well as goods markets, so for each industry i at each date t:
Cit = Yit (1.6)
Productivity in each occupation j and industry i evolves over time from learning-
by-doing− which is not internalized by individual agents3 − according to the following
learning-by-doing function:
φi,j,t+1 = φijt[(1 + L˜ijt)
1−σ(1 + L˜jt)σ]ρ (1.7)
where φijt is productivity in occupation j in industry i at date t; L˜ijt is the share
of the economy’s total effective labor in occupation j in industry i at date t; L˜jt is
the share of the economy’s total effective labor in occupation j at date t, summed
across all industries4; and ρ > 0 is an exogenous parameter governing the rate of
learning-by-doing, while σ ∈ (0, 1) governs the extent to which this learning spills
over across industries. φij0 is exogenously given for each occupation j and industry i.
Equation (1.7) is saying, for example, that the higher the fraction of the work force
working as engineers, the more learning-by-doing there will be among engineers. The
3The assumption that learning-by-doing is in the form of externalities is made for tractability,
and is common in the macroeconomic literature on learning-by-doing, a brief survey of which is
given by Acemoglu (2008). Furthermore, the functional form in equation (1.7) − in particular, the
assumption of a constant elasticity of learning with respect to labor usage − is widely used in this
same literature; the novelty here is in the occupational dimension of learning.
4That is, L˜ijt ≡ φijtLijt∑
j
∑
i φijtLijt
and L˜jt ≡
∑
i φijtLijt∑
j
∑
i φijtLijt
. This formulation (in terms of shares
rather than levels) is chosen in order to avoid country-level scale effects − i.e., a doubling of the
total size of the labor force causing a doubling of the rate of per capita economic growth − which
are at odds with the data (see Rose (2006)). Equivalently, one could model the learning process
as a function of levels rather than shares, thereby exhibiting scale effects, but with the learning
happening at a local level (e.g., the city level), with learning spillovers across localities weak enough
that the scale effects do not operate at the country level − this echoes a similar point made by
Ramondo et al (2016).
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elasticity of learning with respect to labor usage is given by ρ. A fraction σ ∈ (0, 1)
of this learning spills over across all engineers, regardless of which industry they are
working in, while the other fraction 1−σ of the engineers’ learning is industry-specific.
Note that implicit in equation (1.7) is an assumption, made for tractability, that ρ and
σ are constant across industries and occupations. In results that are available upon
request, I relax this assumption. However, it is worth emphasizing that even without
making any assumptions about occupations or industries exogenously varying from
one another in their rates of learning-by-doing, the model still results in heterogeneity
across industries in the amount of learning spillovers they generate, due to their
different levels of centrality in the occupational network of industries, as we will see
below.
1.2.2 Equilibrium
Given the parameters {βi, γ, Lt, αij, , ρ, σ, φij0}i,j,t, an equilibrium of the economy is
defined as a path {Lijt, Yi, Ci}i,j,t such that at each date t,
1. The household’s consumption of each good {Cit}i maximizes its utility subject
to its budget constraint, given prices {Pit}i and the wage wt,
2. In each industry i, the industry-i representative firm’s employment of each
occupation {Lijt}j maximizes its profit, given the price of its output Pit and the
wage wt,
3. The labor market clears:
∑
i
∑
j Lijt = Lt,
4. The goods markets clear: Cit = Yit for every industry i, and
5. Productivity in each occupation j and industry i evolves over time according
to the learning-by-doing equation (1.7).
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The equilibrium of this economy, which for any set of parameters always exists and
is unique, is characterized as follows. The equations below are derived in the usual
way from the CES structure of the production and utility functions in equations (1.1)
and (1.3). In what follows, I normalize the nominal wage wt at each date t to 1, with
all other prices expressed relative to this.
The equilibrium price of output in industry i is
Pit = [
∑
j
(αij)
(
1
φijt
)1−]
1
1− (1.8)
Equilibrium consumption and production in industry i are
Yit = Cit =
(βi)
γ(Pit)
−γLt∑
i(βi)
γ(Pit)1−γ
(1.9)
The equilibrium usage of occupation-j labor in industry i is
Lijt =
(αij)
(φijt)
−1PitYit∑
j(αij)
(φijt)−1
(1.10)
As described in the previous section, productivity in each industry and occupation
φijt evolves from date t to t+1 according to the learning-by-doing equation (1.7), with
φij0 given for each occupation j and industry i. For a given specification of parameters,
equations (1.7) through (1.10) characterize the equilibrium of the economy.
1.2.3 Inter-industry learning spillovers
To see how the occupational learning-by-doing induces a network structure among
industries, consider an increase in production in some arbitrary industry i and what
effect this has on growth in some other arbitrary industry h.
Given an increase in production in industry i, this induces more usage of each
occupation j, by an amount governed by αij, which is the parameter in industry i’s
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production function (1.3) which governs how intensely industry i uses occupation j.
This extra usage of occupation j induces more learning-by-doing in occupation
j. This lowers the cost of production in industry h, by an amount governed by αhj,
since αhj governs how intensely industry h uses occupation j.
Thus, the extent to which growth in industry i lowers the cost of production in
industry h is a function of how similar industries i and h are, in terms of how much
they use each occupation.
We can gain further intuition into the network structure of learning spillovers
among industries by considering the simple case where the representative household’s
utility function is Cobb-Douglas, the representative firms’ production functions are
Leontief, and σ = 1 (that is, occupational learning perfectly spills over across indus-
tries). In this case, we get the following intuitive result, as a first-order log-linear
approximation, for how much an exogenous increase in production in industry i at
date t induces extra output growth in industry h in equilibrium between date t and
date t+ 1:
d log Yh,t+1
d log Yit
≈ ρ
∑
j
αhjα˜ij (1.11)
where α˜ij is the relative intensity with which industry i uses occupation j − that
is, α˜ij ≡ αij∑
i αij
− 1
I
, where I is the number of industries. The derivation of this result
is given in Appendix (A.1).
The result in equation (1.11) makes it explicit that if industries i and h are more
similar to each other in their occupational usage − that is, if αhj is high for the same
occupations for which α˜ij is high − then industries i and h will have a larger amount
of learning spillovers between them.
Note that equation (1.11) only describes how growth in industry i induces growth
in industry h one period ahead. But also note that, under this first-order approxi-
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mation, this relationship does not change over time. If we carry this approximation
forward, then we get the intuitive result that industry i’s importance to long-run
aggregate growth (in a sense that will be made precise below) is a function of the
Bonacich centrality of industry i in the network of learning spillovers.5
Formally, let A denote the matrix whose (i, h) element is
d log Yh,t+1
d log Yit
in equation
(1.11) above − that is, A is the network matrix for the network of inter-industry
learning spillovers. Then an industry’s importance to long-run aggregate growth
is captured, under this first-order approximation, by its Bonacich centrality in this
network − that is:
W ≈ β + δ(I− δA)−1Aβ (1.12)
where β is the vector of each industry’s exponent in the representative household’s
Cobb-Douglas utility function, δ is the representative household’s discount factor, I is
the identity matrix, and W is the vector whose ith element is the percentage increase
in the total discounted utility of the representative household (from date t onward)
from a one percent increase in production in industry i at date t. The derivation of
this result is given in Appendix (A.1).
1.3 Open-economy model
In the previous section I showed how, in the presence of occupational learning-by-
doing, industries that are more central in the network of inter-industry occupational
learning spillovers will contribute more to aggregate growth. In this section I extend
the analysis to incorporate multiple countries trading with each other, in order to
5Bonacich centrality is a measure of how important a node is in a network − e.g., in a network
of friends, the Bonacich centrality of an individual is her number of friends, plus a discount factor
times the number of friends her friends have, plus the discount factor squared times the number of
friends her friends of friends have, ad infinitum.
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address the question of how a country’s amount of aggregate growth depends on which
industries it produces in equilibrium, i.e., on which industries it has a comparative
advantage in. Moreover, the dynamics of comparative advantage that endogenously
arise from this open-economy model will allow me in Section 2.3 to identify learning-
by-doing in the data.
In this section I combine the model from section 1.2 with the static model of Ri-
cardian trade from Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012) (henceforth “CDK”).6
At each date t, the model in this section is essentially the CDK model − the only
difference is that there are multiple occupations, but this only matters for dynamics.
The dynamics of the model, as in section 1.2, are governed by learning-by-doing − as
before, this learning-by-doing is within each occupation, which spills over to everyone
in the occupation regardless of the industry for which they are working, generat-
ing network effects among industries. The important thing to note here, which was
a moot point in the single closed economy case, is that these spillovers are within
countries, not across countries.7
1.3.1 Economic environment and equilibrium
As before, time is discrete and indexed by t. There are now N countries, indexed by
m and n. As before, there are I goods8, but now each good i comes in a countably
infinite number of varieties indexed by ω ∈ Ω ≡ {1, ...,+∞}.9
6The CDK model is an extension of Eaton and Kortum (2002) that allows for multiple industries.
More precisely, it allows for asymmetries in the production function parameters across industries;
this allowance for asymmetries across industries (in my case, asymmetries in how intensely each
industry uses each occupation) is what makes the CDK model useful for my purposes.
7In an extension to the analysis that is available upon request, I allow for learning to partially
spill over across countries. Note that if learning perfectly spills over across countries, the model is
trivial; the amount of productivity growth in each industry is then equalized across countries rather
than being a function of which industries are produced in each particular country. The model is
only interesting when there is at least some degree of localization of learning, and in the baseline
analysis I explore the simplest possible case in which learning is entirely localized.
8I use the terms “goods” and “industries” interchangeably throughout this section.
9This infinite-variety structure is standard in the Ricardian trade literature, for the following
reason. If there were only one variety of each good, then the equilibrium would be riddled with
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As before, labor is the only factor of production; workers can work in J different
occupations, indexed by j. Labor is perfectly mobile across occupations but immobile
across countries. Country m is endowed exogenously with Lmt workers at date t;
each worker in country m at date t is paid wage wmt, which will be determined in
equilibrium.
The production structure of the economy is analogous to the closed-economy ver-
sion of the model, except with the addition of total factor productivity terms, which
will be discussed below. Specifically, the production function for variety ω of final
good i in country m is as follows:
yimt(ω) = zim(ω)[
∑
j
αij(φijmtLijmt(ω))
−1
 ]

−1 (1.13)
where yimt(ω) is the quantity of variety ω of final good i produced in country m at
date t; Lijmt(ω) is the amount of raw labor in occupation j used in the production of
variety ω of final good i in country m at time t; φjmt is productivity in occupation j in
industry i in country m at date t (which evolves over time from learning-by-doing, as
explained below); αij is an exogenous parameter governing the intensity with which
industry i uses occupation j;  is the elasticity of substitution across occupations; and
zim(ω) is the total factor productivity of variety ω of final good i in country m, to be
discussed below.
The TFP term zim(ω) is a random variable drawn independently for each triplet
(i,m, ω) from a Fre´chet distribution Fim(·) such that10
corner solutions – that is, for each good j and each country i, one hundred percent of country i’s
consumption of good j would be sourced by whichever country n could produce and deliver good j
to country i most cheaply (or, in knife-edge cases in which two or more countries could do so equally
cheaply, there would be multiple equilibria). With the infinite-variety structure, this is exactly what
happens at the variety level, but when we aggregate up to the good level − as we will do when
taking the model to data − we have interior solutions.
10This Fre´chet distributional assumption is widely used in the quantitative Ricardian trade litera-
ture. Kortum (1997) and Eaton and Kortum (1999) show how this structure can arise endogenously
from a process of technological innovation and diffusion − the intuition is that when each variety
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Fim(z) = exp[−( z
zim
)−θ] (1.14)
for all z ≥ 0, where zim > 0 ∀i,m and θ > 1. zim is the total factor productivity of
country m in good i when averaged across good i’s infinite varieties, while θ governs
the dispersion of productivity, which is an important parameter in the Ricardian
trade literature, because the more that productivity varies, the more important is
the force of comparative advantage. Note that, for my purposes, these parameters
are fixed over time, while the occupational productivity terms evolve over time from
learning-by-doing, as will be discussed below.
Now let us consider trade between countries. I will make the standard assumption
of iceberg trade costs, meaning that for each unit of good i shipped from country m
to country n, only 1
dimn
< 1 units arrive, with dimn such that dimm = 1 ∀m and
dimn ≤ dimldiln for any third country l.
It follows from the CES production structure in (1.13), combined with the as-
sumption of iceberg trade costs, that
cimnt(ω) =
dimnwmt
zim(ω)
[
∑
j
(αij)
(φijmt)
−1]
1
1− (1.15)
is the cost of producing and delivering one unit of variety ω of good i from country
m to country n at date t. Aggregating up to the good level, define cimnt as follows:
cimnt ≡ dimnwmt
zim
[
∑
j
(αij)
(φijmt)
−1]
1
1− (1.16)
Markets are perfectly competitive, and therefore the price pint(ω) paid by buyers
of each good is produced according to the best known technique for producing that variety in that
country, then the distribution of productivity across varieties in a country will be an extreme value
distribution such as the Fre´chet. Moreover, as discussed in Eaton and Kortum (2002), among ex-
treme value distributions, the Fre´chet distribution uniquely gives us a tractable framework in which
the equilibrium distributions of labor requirements, costs of production, and prices are all in the
same family.
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in country n for variety ω of good i at date t is
pint(ω) = min
1≤m≤N
[cimnt(ω)] (1.17)
and the set of varieties of good i that are exported by country m to country n at
date t is given by
Ωimnt ≡ {ω ∈ Ω|cimnt(ω) = min
1≤l≤N
cilnt(ω)} (1.18)
Each country has a representative consumer whose utility function is a Cobb-
Douglas function of the composite goods, where each composite good is a CES func-
tion of its infinite varieties. Let βim be country m’s Cobb-Douglas exponent on good
i, and let σim be country m’s elasticity of substitution among the infinite varieties of
good i. (As in CDK (2012), I assume σim < 1 + θ ∀i,m.) Accordingly, define pimt as
follows:
pimt ≡ [
∑
ω∈Ω
pimt(ω)
1−σim ]
1
1−σim (1.19)
Then, defining eimt(ω) as total expenditure by country m on variety ω of good i
at date t, we have
eimt(ω) = (
pimt(ω)
pimt
)1−σimβimwmtLmt (1.20)
Furthermore, define eimnt as the value (in dollar terms) of total exports of good i
from country m to country n at date t; that is,
eimnt ≡
∑
ω∈Ωimnt
eint(ω) (1.21)
Then we get the result that
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eimnt =
(cimnt)
−θ∑N
l=1(cilnt)
−θβinwntLnt (1.22)
The date-t equilibrium of the world economy is pinned down by a balanced trade
condition. Let piimnt be country m’s share of the world exports (in dollar terms) of
good i to country n at date t; that is,
piimnt ≡ eimnt∑N
l=1 eilnt
(1.23)
Then, for a given wage vector wt = (wmt)m,
Zmt = (
N∑
n=1
I∑
i=1
piimntβinwntLnt)− wmtLm (1.24)
is the excess demand for country m’s labor at date t. The equilibrium at date t
is pinned down by specifying that Zmt = 0 for every country m.
As is typical in the Ricardian trade literature, there is no closed form solution
for this date-t equilibrium, but it can be computed using an algorithm from Alvarez
and Lucas (2007). The basic idea behind their algorithm is simple: start with an
arbitrary guess for the equilibrium wage vector wt = (wmt)i, calculate each country’s
excess demand for labor Zmt, and then raise the wage of any country m for which
Zmt > 0 while lowering the wage of any country m for which Zmt < 0. Keep doing
this, and, under regularity conditions discussed by Alvarez and Lucas, the algorithm
will converge to a unique equilibrium wage (from which the equilibrium values of all
other variables can be straightforwardly computed).
That completes the description of the economy at date t. Each country’s pro-
ductivity in each occupation evolves over time from learning-by-doing − which is
not internalized by individual agents − according to the following learning-by-doing
function:
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φi,j,m,t+1 = φijmt[(1 + L˜ijmt)
1−σ(1 + L˜jmt)σ]ρ (1.25)
where L˜ijmt is the share of country m’s total effective labor in occupation j in
industry i at date t, summed across all varieties of industry i; L˜jmt is the share of
country m’s total effective labor in occupation j at date t, summed across all varieties
of all industries11; ρ > 0 is an exogenous parameter governing the rate of occupational
learning-by-doing, while σ ∈ (0, 1) governs the extent to which this learning spills over
across industries; and φijm0 is exogenously given for each occupation j, industry i,
and country m.
1.3.2 Inter-industry spillovers in the open-economy model
In section 1.2.3 we asked, in the context of the closed-economy version of the model,
when we give an exogenous positive shock to production in a specific industry, what
are the effects on every other industry? In this section we ask, using the open-economy
version of the model, when we give an exogenous positive shock to production in a
specific industry in a specific country, what are the effects on every other industry in
every other country? Furthermore, what are the effects on each country’s welfare?
To start with, the inter-industry learning spillovers that were already present in
the closed-economy model carry over to the open-economy model. Now, however,
thanks to international trade, the learning-by-doing induced in a country by extra
production in an industry will affect other industries in that country not only through
direct learning spillovers, but also through indirect general equilibrium effects; an
increase in learning-by-doing in a country pushes up the country’s equilibrium wage,
which − all else being equal − makes industries in that country less competitive, and
furthermore, consumers in all countries benefit from the fall in the costs of production
11That is, L˜ijmt ≡
∑
ω φijmtLijmt(ω)∑
j
∑
i
∑
ω φijmtLijmt(ω)
and L˜jmt ≡
∑
i
∑
ω φijmtLijmt(ω)∑
j
∑
i
∑
ω φijmtLijmt(ω)
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(and hence prices) induced by learning-by-doing, not just the learning country.
If, as in section 1.2.3, we consider the particular case in which representative
firms’ production functions are Leontief, then the network structure of inter-industry
spillovers takes a particularly simple, intuitive form, as we will see below. Further-
more, in what follows, purely to simplify the expressions, I set the size of each coun-
try’s labor force equal to one another (normalized to 1), I set each industry’s exponent
in each country’s representative consumer’s Cobb-Douglas utility function equal to
one another (namely, 1/I, where I is the number of industries), and I set σ = 1 (i.e.,
occupational learning perfectly spills over across industries). Lastly, in order for the
model to be analytically tractable, I assume in this section that trade costs are zero.12
Under the above simplifying assumptions, the first-order approximation of country
m’s wage at date t is13
wmt ≈ [
∑
i
(
zim∑
j αijψjmt
)θ]
1
1+θ (1.26)
Note that this is a weighted average of country m’s date-t productivity in industry
i across all i, as one would intuitively expect. This result holds with exact equality
when the productivity terms are symmetric across countries and industries, but it is
only an approximation otherwise. The results in this section, which are first-order
approximations, are derived by plugging (1.26) into the equations of the model and
then log-linearizing the resulting system of equations.
For the purposes of this section, let yˆimt denote the logarithm of production in
country m in industry i at date t, and let Wˆmt denote the logarithm of country m’s
welfare at date t. Further, let
12Generalizing this analysis to non-zero trade costs is straightforward, so long as the trade costs are
symmetric across countries and industries − as discussed in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), asymmetric
trade costs make it difficult to get any analytical traction in a Ricardian trade model like this one.
13The derivation of this result is available upon request, along with all the other results of this
section.
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α˜ijm ≡
αij
zim∑
i
αij
zim
−
1
zim∑
i
1
zim
(1.27)
which is the relative intensity with which industry i uses occupation j in country
m.
Effects of production in one industry on next-period production in another
industry
Results (1.28) and (1.29) below answer the question, given a positive shock at date
t to production in industry i in country m, what effect does this have on production
at date t+ 1 in industry h in country n?
For any country m and any pair of industries i and h:
dyˆh,m,t+1
dyˆimt
≈ [1 + (N − 1
N
)θ]ρ
∑
j
αhjα˜ijm − [(1
I
)(
N − 1
N
)θ]ρ
∑
i′
∑
j
αi′jα˜ijm (1.28)
and for any pair of countries m and n 6= m and any pair of industries i and h:
dyˆh,n,t+1
dyˆimt
≈ −[( 1
N
)θ]ρ
∑
j
αhjα˜ijm + [(
1
I
)(
1
N
)θ]ρ
∑
i′
∑
j
αi′jα˜ijm (1.29)
The intuition behind (1.28) and (1.29) is as follows. The increase in production
in industry i in country m has a direct effect and an indirect effect.
The direct effect is as follows. For each occupation j, the extent to which an
increase in production in industry i in country m corresponds to an increase in usage
of occupation j relative to other occupations (and hence an increase in learning-by-
doing in occupation j) is given by α˜ijm (which, examining (1.27), can be positive or
negative, since learning-by-doing is based on relative occupational usage). The extent
to which this extra learning-by-doing in occupation j benefits industry h is given by
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αhj. Hence, the size of learning spillovers between industries i and h is
∑
j αhjα˜ijm. If
industries i and h are similar (dissimilar) enough to each other in their occupational
usage, then
∑
j αhjα˜ijm is greater (less) than zero, and the direct effect on industry h
within country m is positive (negative), while it is negative (positive) in every other
country, because in every other country industry h becomes relatively less (more)
competitive compared to country m.
The direct effect is scaled by ρ, since ρ is the rate of learning-by-doing. Further-
more, the direct effect on each other country is scaled by 1
N
, where N is the number
of countries, as well as θ, since θ is the trade elasticity. This is balanced by the
fact that the direct effect on country m itself is scaled by [1 + (N−1
N
)θ]; note that
[1 + (N−1
N
)θ]− (N − 1)( 1
N
)θ = 1, i.e., the scale factors on the direct effects across the
world sum to one.
The indirect effect on industry h is as follows. Industry h is, of course, not the
only industry directly affected by industry i. Summing the term
∑
j αhjα˜ijm across
all industries gives us
∑
i′
∑
j αi′jα˜ijm, which is the size of the total learning spillovers
from industry i to all other industries − or, using network terminology, it is the first-
degree centrality of industry i in the network of industries. If industry i is sufficiently
central (sufficiently peripheral), then
∑
i′
∑
j αi′jα˜ijm is greater (less) than zero, and
the high (low) amount of learning-by-doing induced by the increase in production in
industry i in country m raises (lowers) country m’s equilibrium wage, which (all else
being equal) makes each industry in country m less (more) competitive and makes
each industry in every other country more (less) competitive.
As with the direct effect, the indirect effect is scaled by ρ, since ρ is the rate of
learning-by-doing. Moreover, the indirect effect (which, bear in mind, is capturing
an individual industry’s effect on the entire economy) is scaled by 1
I
, where I is the
number of industries. As with the direct effect, the indirect effect on each other
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country is scaled by 1
N
, where N is the number of countries, as well as θ, since θ is
the trade elasticity. This is balanced by the fact that the indirect effect on country
m itself is scaled by (N−1
N
)θ; note that −(N−1
N
)θ + (N − 1)( 1
N
)θ = 0, i.e., the scale
factors on the indirect effects across the world sum to zero.
Note that if N = 1 (i.e., there is only one country in the world), then the indirect
effect is zero, and the total effect of the industry-i shock on industry h is ρ
∑
j αhjα˜ijm,
which is exactly the same as the closed-economy results from section 1.2.3.14
Effects on each country’s next-period welfare
Results (1.30) and (1.31) below answer the question, given the aforementioned positive
shock at date t to production in industry i in country m, what effect does this have
on the date t+ 1 welfare of country n?
For any country m and industry i:
dWˆm,t+1
dyˆimt
≈ (1
I
)[1− (N − 1
N
)(
1
1 + θ
)]ρ
∑
i′
∑
j
αi′jα˜ijm (1.30)
and for any pair of countries m and n 6= m and any industry i:
dWˆn,t+1
dyˆimt
≈ (1
I
)[(
1
N
)(
1
1 + θ
)]ρ
∑
i′
∑
j
αi′jα˜ijm (1.31)
The intuition behind (1.30) and (1.31) partly carries over from the intuition above
for the indirect effects in Results (1.28) and (1.29) − the effects of the date t shock to
industry i on countries’ welfare at date t+ 1 is a function of industry i’s first-degree
centrality
∑
i′
∑
j αi′jα˜ijm, and again this is scaled by ρ and
1
I
(and by 1
N
for countries
other than m) for the same reasons as above.
Note, though, that the right-hand sides of (1.30) and (1.31) have the same sign
14There is a trivial difference, namely, the α˜ terms now (by (1.27)) include z terms, which made
no appearance in the closed-economy results, but that was just because there were no z terms in the
closed-economy model. If we were to add them in, we would get exactly the same result as here.
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rather than opposite signs;
∑
i′
∑
j αi′jα˜ijm is greater (less) than zero when industry
i is sufficiently central (peripheral) in the network that an increase in production in
industry i in country m induces more (less) learning in the aggregate economy of
country m, in which case other countries benefit (are hurt) as well, due to buying
products from country m at a lower (higher) cost.
Furthermore, note that the effect on other countries is scaled by 1
1+θ
rather than
θ; a higher θ dampens the effect on other countries rather than exacerbating it −
a higher θ means less heterogeneity in intra-industry productivity, meaning (all else
being equal) international trade is less important for a country’s welfare, meaning
extra economy-wide learning in country i benefits other countries less. (This is in
contrast with Results (1.28) and (1.29), which were looking at the effects on a specific
industry h, which are exacerbated when intra-industry productivity varies less.)
Given that the effect on other countries is scaled by ( 1
N
)( 1
1+θ
), this is balanced
by the effect on country m itself being scaled by [1 − (N−1
N
)( 1
1+θ
)]; note that [1 −
(N−1
N
)( 1
1+θ
)] + (N − 1)( 1
N
)( 1
1+θ
) = 1, i.e., the scale effects on welfare across the world
sum to one.
Effects on production and welfare more than one period ahead
Results (1.28) through (1.31) are only telling us the next-period effects of a shock to
production in industry i in country m; now let us consider the effects arbitrarily far
into the future. First we will consider the effects over time on production in each
industry in each country. Let Amn denote the I X I matrix whose (i, h) element is
dyˆh,n,t+1
dyˆimt
(which we found an approximation for above, which does not depend on t).
Let A be the (NI) X (NI) matrix formed by appending the Amn matrices to each
other, so that the (m,n) block of A is Amn.
Start from an arbitrary equilibrium path {yˆ?imt}i,m,t and consider an arbitrary
vector of shocks to production in each industry in each country at date t: let yt be
25
the (NI)-dimensional vector whose first I elements are yˆi1t − yˆ?i1t for each industry i
in country 1; the next I elements of yt are yˆi2t − yˆ?i2t for each industry i in country 2;
and so on.
If we take the first-order approximations that we found above and suppose that
they approximately hold at any arbitrary point, then we have the result that for any
date t and any length of time τ beyond t:
yt+τ ≈ (A′)τyt (1.32)
While the single-closed-economy model involved a network of industries, (1.32) is
saying that we can think of this multi-country, open-economy model as involving a
network of countries and industries, where each node in the network is a country-
industry pair, and the network matrix A (whose entries we found above) gives us the
effect of an increase in production in industry i in country m on every other industry
in every other country, with these effects being the aforementioned sum of direct
learning spillovers and general equilibrium effects via international trade.
Now let us consider the effects of this shock to production in industry i in country
m on each country’s discounted sum of welfare, summing from date t to ∞. Let wn
be the (NI)-dimensional vector whose first I elements are dWˆn,t+1
dyˆi1t
for each industry
i in country 1 (which we found an approximation for above, which does not depend
on t), whose second I elements are dWˆn,t+1
dyˆi2t
for each industry i in country 2, and so
on. Let W¯n denote the discounted sum of country n’s logarithm of welfare over time,
discounted at the rate δ − that is, W¯n ≡
∑∞
t=0 δ
tWˆnt.
Note, then, that dWn
dyt
is the (NI)-dimensional vector whose first I entries are dWn
dyˆi1t
for each industry i in country 1, whose second I entries are dWn
dyˆi2t
for each industry i in
country 2, and so on. In other words, dWn
dyt
is the vector telling us how much a shock
at date t to each country-industry pair affects country n’s discounted infinite sum
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of welfare from date t onward. For any arbitrary country n, we have the following
result:
dW n
dyt
≈ δwn + δ2Awn + δ3A2wn + ... (1.33)
Letting I denote the identity matrix, we can write this as
dW n
dyt
≈ δ(I + δA+ δ2A2 + ...)wn (1.34)
And so we have, for any arbitrary country n:
dW n
dyt
≈ δ(I− δA)−1wn (1.35)
The right-hand side of (1.35) is the vector of each country-industry pair’s Bonacich
centrality (from country n’s perspective) in the network of country-industry pairs.
Recall from section 1.2.3 that for any arbitrary network, a node’s Bonacich centrality
is equal to the sum of its first-degree links with every other node discounted by a
discount factor δ, plus the sum of its second-degree links with other nodes discounted
by δ2, and so on. In this case the links are weighted by the vector wn, which tells
us how much a shock to production in a given country-industry pair in a given time
period affects country n’s next-period welfare − which, as we found above, relates to
each country-industry pair’s first-degree centrality in the network.
1.4 Conclusions
This chapter proposes a novel mechanism through which different industries con-
tribute differently to long-run economic growth. In particular, it shows how occu-
pational learning-by-doing induces a particular endogenous network of inter-industry
27
learning spillovers, in which industries that are more central in this network generate
more aggregate growth, and countries with comparative advantages in these more
central industries grow more in equilibrium. In the next chapter I will show that
these effects are quantitatively significant.
Given the learning externalities that play a front-and-center role in the model,
the model implies potential scope for welfare-enhancing policy. In some respects,
this echoes a previous generation of theoretical literature that argued that, if some
industries generate more learning spillovers than others, then there are grounds for
governmental prioritization of the more learning-intensive industries. The novelty
here is that, in the presence of occupational learning spillovers, even if industries are
symmetric to one another in their rate of learning, there are potentially grounds for
prioritizing industries that are more central in the network of occupational learning
diffusion. Such prioritization can take the form of, for example, credit subsidies to
specific industries, or industry-specific tariff policy. This is explored further in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 2
The Diffusion of Occupational Learning
Across Industries: Empirics
2.1 Introduction
The principle of comparative advantage is two centuries old, but only recently
have Ricardian models of trade been developed that are capable of guiding empirical
estimation of the pattern of comparative advantage and how it changes over time.1
Recent contributions in this literature have shown that there are in fact significant
changes in comparative advantage over time, and in particular, a country’s level of
comparative advantage in an industry has a significant effect on future growth of that
country’s comparative advantage in that industry. What drives these dynamics is an
open question.2 A leading theory, heavily emphasized in prior theoretical literature
but not yet brought to bear on these new findings, is the theory of learning-by-doing
− that countries get better over time at what they already produce.3
In this chapter I use the model of trade and growth through learning-by-doing
from the previous chapter in order to analytically and quantitatively characterize the
relationship between learning-by-doing and the evolution of comparative advantage.
Intuitively, the essence of learning-by-doing is that the amount one learns something
1Eaton and Kortum (2012) provide a survey of this literature.
2See Levchenko and Zhang (2016) and Hanson, Lind, and Muendler (2016). Quoting from
Levchenko and Zhang (2016), “A theoretical and quantitative framework with endogenous sectoral
productivity that can be used for understanding the empirical patterns uncovered here has not yet
been developed, and remains a potentially fruitful direction for future research.”
3See Acemoglu (2008) for a survey of the theoretical literature on learning-by-doing.
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(and hence the amount one gets relatively better or worse at it, i.e., the increase or
decrease in one’s comparative advantage in it) depends on how much one does it, and
how much one does something depends, in equilibrium, on how much of a comparative
advantage one has in it in the first place.
Using the structure of the model from the previous chapter, I analytically derive
the particular evolution of comparative advantage implied by learning-by-doing. Re-
call that the model allows not only for intra-industry learning, but also diffusion of
occupational learning across industries. In the case of purely intra-industry learning,
the evolution of comparative advantage takes a simple form: the change over time in
a country’s comparative advantage in an industry is only a function of its current level
of comparative advantage in that industry itself. When learning has an occupational
dimension, growth in a country’s comparative advantage in industry i is a function
of its level of employment of each occupation, which in equilibrium is a function of
the country’s current level of comparative advantage not only in industry i but also
each other industry h, to the extent that industry h uses the same occupations as i.
The dynamics of comparative advantage are examined empirically using data on
bilateral, industry-specific trade flows. In line with previous literature, I find a signif-
icant association between a country’s future growth in comparative advantage in an
industry and its level of comparative advantage in that industry itself. In addition,
I provide a novel empirical finding: a country’s growth in comparative advantage
in an industry is positively correlated with its initial level of comparative advantage
in occupationally similar industries, holding fixed the country’s initial comparative
advantage in the industry itself. Occupational similarity is measured using US data
on the relative intensities with which each industry employs each occupation. This
finding is in line with the mechanism of inter-industry occupational learning diffusion
highlighted by the theory.
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I then take a more structural approach, using the observed dynamics in compar-
ative advantage, in combination with the structure of the model, to back out the
model-implied amount of occupational learning and the extent to which it spills over
across industries. I find that a one percentage point increase in the share of a country’s
labor force in an occupation is associated with 10-13% higher growth in productivity
in that occupation in that country from one decade to the next, with at least 70% of
this higher occupational productivity diffusing across industries. Compared to intra-
industry learning, I find that cross-industry learning diffusion explains at least four
times as much of the observed changes over time in comparative advantage.
Recall from the previous chapter that occupational learning has important impli-
cations not only for the dynamics of comparative advantage, but also for aggregate
growth. In particular, recall that the model predicts that countries with compara-
tive advantages in industries that are more central in the network of inter-industry
occupational learning diffusion will grow more in the aggregate. I use the aforemen-
tioned estimates of the learning parameters of the model in order to quantify the
importance of this effect. According to the estimated model, on average, 38% of
an industry’s contribution to aggregate growth is through the inter-industry learning
spillovers that it generates. This has important policy implications; in particular, I
use the estimated model to show how the relative costs and benefits of tariffs in spe-
cific industries significantly depends on the amount of learning diffusion each industry
generates.
In sum, in this chapter I show that a significant fraction of the observed changes
over time in the pattern of comparative advantage across countries and industries
can be rationalized by occupational learning-by-doing, and that this has important
implications for aggregate growth. I do this by exploiting a particularly salient impli-
cation of learning-by-doing, namely, a specific relationship between the cross-sectional
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pattern of comparative advantage at a given point in time, and changes in compar-
ative advantage from that period to the next. It is worth noting, however, that
learning-by-doing is not the only mechanism that can generate such a relationship.
For example, dynamic occupational economies of scale on the firms’ side − i.e., when
a larger number of people are employed in an occupation, employers better learn over
time how to efficiently hire and make use of this occupation − can result in a simi-
lar relationship. This chapter makes no claim of specifically isolating the particular
mechanism of workers learning over time in their occupation. But given the heavy
emphasis that learning-by-doing has received in prior literature, it is used to guide
our thinking throughout this chapter.
This chapter contributes to the recent literature that empirically investigates the
evolution of technological comparative advantage. Recall from the previous chapter
that the cross-sectional trade structure of the model follows Costinot, Donaldson, and
Komunjer (2012), a multi-industry extension of the multi-country model of Eaton and
Kortum (2002). This structure overcomes a crucial limitation of previous Ricardian
models of trade, by allowing for a country’s productivity in an industry to be char-
acterized not just by a single number but by an entire distribution, with the mean
of this distribution varying at the country-industry level. Hence, the model-implied
pattern of comparative advantage across countries and industries is not − as in a
classic Ricardian model − simply a specification of which country has a comparative
advantage in which industry, but also how much of a comparative advantage each
country has in each industry. This allows one to examine gradual changes over time
in the pattern of comparative advantage.
This chapter is particularly closely related to Levchenko and Zhang (2016) and
Hanson, Lind, and Muendler (2016) (henceforth “L&Z” and “HLM,” respectively),
both of whom examine the dynamics of country-industry-level comparative advan-
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tage. In particular, both studies find a negative effect of a country’s initial level of
comparative advantage in an industry on that country’s subsequent growth in com-
parative advantage in that industry. The results of this chapter are in line with theirs,
despite various differences in the data and methodology, which suggests the finding
is quite robust. L&Z informally argue (but do not formally demonstrate) that their
results go against the theory of learning-by-doing, at least at their data’s particular
level of aggregation. In this chapter, however, I formally show that L&Z’s argument
only holds under certain strong assumptions about the learning process; I show that,
in general, learning-by-doing is, in fact, consistent with the empirical evidence.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 analytically character-
izes the link between learning-by-doing and the evolution of comparative advantage,
and provides reduced-form evidence of such a link. In Section 2.3 I put quantitative
discipline on the theory by taking the model to data on trade and employment. I
then use the estimated model to quantify the importance of inter-industry learning
diffusion to the dynamics of comparative advantage, the contribution of each industry
to aggregate growth, and the effects of industry-specific tariffs on aggregate growth.
Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The evolution of comparative advantage
The previous chapter showed how, in the presence of occupational learning, countries
with a comparative advantage in industries that are more central in the network of
occupational learning spillovers will grow more in the aggregate. How does the pattern
of comparative advantage itself evolve over time, as workers in different countries are
learning different things? In this section, I answer this question theoretically and
empirically.
I start in Section 2.2.1 by deriving the model-implied dynamics of comparative
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advantage. To aid intuition, I analyze in section 2.2.2 a stripped-down version of
the model with only industry-level learning-by-doing (i.e., without any occupational
dimension to learning), in which case the evolution of comparative advantage takes
a particularly simple form. In Section 2.2.3 I provide evidence in support of the
mechanism underlying the model. In particular, a country’s growth in comparative
advantage in an industry is positively correlated with its initial level of comparative
advantage in occupationally similar industries.
2.2.1 Model-implied dynamics of comparative advantage
I use the open-economy model of Section 1.3 to provide an analytical characterization
of the relationship between learning-by-doing and the evolution of comparative advan-
tage. I will use this characterization in Section 2.3 to calibrate the learning-by-doing
parameters to match the observed changes over time in trade data.
Let eimnt denote the date-t dollar value of exports in industry i from country
m to country n. In the CDK model, the logarithm of eimnt is equal to a sum of
exporter-importer, importer-industry, and exporter-industry dummies, plus an or-
thogonal error term:
ln eimnt = δmnt + δint + δimt + εimnt (2.1)
The pattern of comparative advantage (i.e., relative productivity differences across
country-industry pairs) can be identified off of the exporter-industry dummies in the
above regression.4 In particular, note that according to the model5,
ln eimnt = δmnt + δint + θ ln zim[
∑
j
(αij)
(φijmt)
−1]
1
−1 (2.2)
4Meanwhile, the exporter-importer dummies account for bilateral trade costs (e.g., distance be-
tween countries), and the importer-industry dummies account for demand-side factors.
5Equation (2.2) can be derived by combining equations (1.16) and (1.22).
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Combining equations (2.1) and (2.2), we have
e
δimt
θ = zim[
∑
j
(αij)
(φijmt)
−1]
1
−1 (2.3)
where the right-hand side of (2.3) is country m’s productivity in industry i at date
t.
Thus, given an estimate of the trade elasticity θ, running regression (2.1) and
plugging the exporter-industry dummy coefficients δimt into equation (2.3) gives us
estimates of country-industry-level productivity. Note that the degrees of freedom in
regression (2.1) are such that δimt is only identified up to a double-normalization of
δim?t = 1 ∀i for some baseline country m? and δi?mt = 1 ∀m for some baseline industry
i? − in other words, δimt captures country m’s comparative advantage in industry i at
date t. The proposition below captures the model’s predictions for how the pattern
of comparative advantage evolves over time.
Proposition 2.2.1. In the economic environment of section 1.3.1, with learning-by-
doing governed by equation (1.25), country m’s comparative advantage in industry i
at date t, δimt, evolves from one period to the next in the following way:
δi,m,t+1 − δimt = θ( 1
− 1) ln(
∑
j
(αij)
[(1 + L˜ijmt)
1−σ(1 + L˜jmt)σ]ρ(−1)) (2.4)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3.
Proposition 2.2.1 shows that a country’s change over time in its comparative
advantage in industry i is a weighted average of the size of each occupation in that
country, both within industry i and summing across industries, with the weight on an
occupation given by how intensely industry i uses the occupation. Note that the size
of each occupation in a country is itself, in equilibrium, determined by that country’s
comparative advantage in each industry, meaning that the change in a country’s
comparative advantage in an industry is a function of its initial level of comparative
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advantage in each industry.
This point − that in the presence of learning-by-doing, changes in comparative
advantage are a function of levels of comparative advantage − is particularly easy to
see when learning-by-doing is only at the industry level, without any occupational
component. To that end, in the following section I analyze a stripped-down version
of the model, in which there are no occupations and learning only happens at the
industry level.
2.2.2 Dynamics of comparative advantage under purely industry-level
learning-by-doing
Empirically, we observe that countries with a larger comparative advantage in an
industry tend on average to experience less future growth in comparative advantage
in that industry. This was first documented by Levchenko and Zhang (2016) and
Hanson, Lind, and Muendler (2016), and is replicated in Section 2.2.3 of this chapter.
One might think that this empirical finding goes against the theory of learning-by-
doing, at least at the industry level. Quoting from p. 106 of Levchenko and Zhang,
“A strong implication of [learning-by-doing] is that relative productivity differences
increase over time − comparative advantage strengthens. This is because learning is
faster in sectors that produce more, and comparative advantage sectors are the ones
that produce more.”
In this section, I formally show that this argument only holds under certain strong
assumptions about the learning process. I show that, in general, learning-by-doing
is, in fact, consistent with the empirical evidence. In order to make the argument
as simple as possible, in this section I drop the occupational dimension from the
analysis − that is, the model in this section is the same as the model in Section
1.3, except there are no occupations, and learning-by-doing is at the industry level.
More specifically, learning-by-doing is a function of industry-level output, and this
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learning-by-doing affects industry-level TFP.
Given that comparative advantage is estimated at the industry level (and not the
occupation level), this makes the link between learning-by-doing and the evolution of
comparative advantage particularly simple. The aim of this section is purely to crys-
talize our thinking on the relationship between learning-by-doing and the dynamics
of comparative advantage; I will not be making use of the results in this section in
the quantitative analysis in Section 2.3.
For the sake of simplicity, in this section I consider the case in which trade costs
are zero, the size of the labor force in each country is equal to 1, and each country’s
representative household’s utility function puts equal weight on each industry.
Given the above discussion, the learning-by-doing equation I will consider in this
subsection takes the following form:
zi,m,t+1
zimt
= (yimt)
ρ (2.5)
where ρ is the rate of learning-by-doing, yimt is country m’s industry-i output at
date t, and zimt is country m’s industry-i productivity
6 at date t, with zim0 given for
each country m and industry i.
For each country m and each industry i, define country m’s comparative advantage
in industry i at date t (which I will denote by CAimt) in terms relative to country
M ’s productivity in industry I at date t − that is:
CAimt ≡
( zimt
zImt
)
( ziMt
zIMt
)
=
zimtzIMt
zImtziMt
(2.6)
Proposition 2.2.2. In the economic environment described above, with industry-level
learning-by-doing governed by equation (2.5) and comparative advantage defined by
(2.6), the change over time in a country’s comparative advantage in an industry
6More precisely, zimt is the parameter of the Fre´chet distribution that governs country m’s average
productivity in industry i at date t, averaged across the infinitely many varieties of industry i.
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is a function of that country’s level of comparative advantage in that industry. In
particular, as a first-order approximation:
d ln(CAi,m,t+1)
d ln(CAimt)
≈ 1 + ρ(1 + [I − 1
I
]θ) (2.7)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.4.
Note from equation (2.7) that if ρ > 0, then
d ln(CAi,m,t+1)
d ln(CAimt)
> 1, i.e., learning-by-
doing (under this particular formulation of learning) induces divergence over time
in comparative advantage: if country 1 has a greater comparative advantage in an
industry than country 2, then over time country 1 will have an even greater compar-
ative advantage in that industry compared to country 2. Proposition 2.2.2 thereby
formalizes the aforementioned intuition from p. 106 of Levchenko and Zhang (2016).
It turns out, however, that this theoretical prediction of divergence in comparative
advantage is, in part, an artifact of the particular formulation of learning assumed in
equation (2.5). There are two aspects of this formulation that are key to generating
the divergence result: (1) the learning-by-doing is purely at the industry level, and
(2) the elasticity of learning with respect to output is constant (given by the single
parameter ρ). If we relax either one of these two assumptions, then learning-by-doing
does not necessarily generate divergence in comparative advantage.
For the sake of the argument, I illustrate below the implications of relaxing as-
sumption (2). In particular, suppose that learning-by-doing exhibits decreasing re-
turns − that is, for a given amount of date-t output in industry i, a country will
learn more in industry i at date t if its date-t productivity in industry was low to
start with. We can think of this as there being “low-hanging fruit” when one is just
starting to learn something, while the more advanced one becomes, the harder and
harder it is to become yet more advanced. Then, whether learning-by-doing induces
convergence or divergence in comparative advantage depends on the relative sizes of
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two opposing forces.
Imagine comparing two countries, one of which is more productive than the other
in industry i at date t. Will the backward country converge to the advanced one, or
will the two countries further diverge? On the one hand, due to the decreasing returns
in the learning-by-doing function, if the two countries were to produce at date t the
same amount of industry i output, the more backward country would learn more −
the size of this effect is captured below by a parameter λ. On the other hand, the
two countries will obviously not produce the same amount of industry i output; the
more advanced country will produce more, due to having a comparative advantage in
it − the size of this effect is captured by the trade elasticity θ. Hence, whether there
is convergence or divergence depends on the relative sizes of λ vs. θ. The tension
between these two forces is captured by the proposition below.
Proposition 2.2.3. Suppose we have the same economic environment as in Propo-
sition 2.2.2, except there are diminishing returns in the learning-by-doing function.
Specifically, suppose the learning-by-doing equation is as follows:
zi,m,t+1
zimt
= (zimt)
−λ(yimt)ρ (2.8)
where λ ≥ 0 governs the rate of diminshing returns to learning-by-doing.
Then learning-by-doing induces convergence or divergence in comparative advan-
tage, depending on how quickly returns to learning-by-doing are diminishing vs. the
size of the trade elasticity (scaled by the number of industries). Specifically, as a first-
order approximation, there is convergence in comparative advantage if λ
ρ
> 1+( I−1
I
)θ,
while there is divergence if λ
ρ
< 1 + ( I−1
I
)θ.
Proof. Through the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2.2.2,
d ln(CAi,m,t+1)
d ln(CAimt)
≈ 1− λ+ ρ(1 + [I − 1
I
]θ) (2.9)
Whether there is convergence or divergence in comparative advantage corresponds
to whether this expression is greater than or less than one. Hence, there is convergence
if λ
ρ
> 1 + ( I−1
I
)θ, while there is divergence if λ
ρ
< 1 + ( I−1
I
)θ.
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This section and the previous section have shown theoretically how learning-by-
doing induces a particular relationship between the cross-sectional pattern of com-
parative advantage, and the evolution of comparative advantage from one period to
the next. Given these theoretical findings, in the following section I provide evidence
of such a relationship.
2.2.3 Evidence on the dynamics of comparative advantage
Section 2.2.2 has shown how, in the presence of industry-level learning-by-doing,
the change in a country’s comparative advantage in an industry is a function of its
level of comparative advantage in that industry. Section 2.2.1 showed how, in the
presence of occupational learning, the change in country m’s comparative advantage
in industry i is a function of country m’s level of usage of each occupation, which is
itself a function of country m’s level of comparative advantage in each industry h,
to the extent that industry h uses similar occupations as i. In this section I provide
evidence of these relationships between levels of comparative advantage and changes
in comparative advantage, both within industries and across industries, as a function
of their occupational similarity. I do so through the following regression:
ln(CAi,m,t+∆)− ln(CAimt) = β0 + β1 ln(CAimt) + β2 ln(OccCAimt) + imt (2.10)
where CAimt is country m’s comparative advantage in industry i at date t, and
OccCAimt is a weighted average of country m’s date-t comparative advantage in every
industry h other than industry i, with each industry h weighted by its occupational
similarity to industry i. The details of the construction of these variables are provided
in Section 2.2.3.
40
Data
In order to estimate comparative advantage using the CDK method, I use interna-
tional trade data from Feenstra et al (2005). The data report bilateral exports among
72 countries, at the 4-digit SITC Revision 2 product level, annually over the years
1962-2000. Hence, an example of an observation in this dataset is that, in 1978, Japan
exported to Italy $2,447,000 (in 1978 nominal US dollars) worth of silk worm cocoons
and silk waste (SITC Rev. 2 code 2614). The number of products that appear in the
data gradually increase over time from 696 in 1962 to 1288 in 2000.7
In order to merge these data with the industry-occupation table described below,
I re-classify exports from 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 product codes into 3-digit 1997 NAICS
industry codes, using a concordance table from Feenstra and Lipsey (n.d.). I restrict
the sample to manufacturing industries that appear in the industry-occupation table,
and I further restrict the sample to countries and industries that appear across the
sample period. We are left, then, with 44 countries and 20 industries, which are listed
in Appendix A.2, in Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively.
Regression (2.10) requires cross-sectional trade data from two different points in
time, t and t + ∆. Rather than estimating each country’s comparative advantage
in each industry each year, and then examining year-by-year fluctuations (which
could be confounded by business cycle phenomena far removed from the subject of
this chapter, as well as a large amount of measurement error), I follow Levchenko
and Zhang (2016) and Hanson, Lind, and Muendler (2016) (“L&Z” and “HLM”)
by averaging eimnt (exports of industry i from country m to country n in year t)
by decade, and then using these averaged export data to estimate each country’s
average comparative advantage in each industry each decade. Comparative advantage
7These data include the dollar value reported by the importing country as well as the value
reported by the exporting country; I follow the standard practice of using the value reported by the
importing country, which is generally seen as more reliable, since countries have more of an incentive
to carefully keep track of goods entering their borders than leaving them.
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is estimated following CDK; that is, ln(CAimt) = δimt/θ, following equation (2.3).
In order to construct the variable OccCAimt, I use 2013 US data on how many
people each industry employs in each occupation, from the Occupational Employment
Statistics (OES) program at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The industries, as
explained above, are classified at the 3-digit NAICS level, while the occupations are
classified at the 2-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) level; the indus-
tries and occupations are reported in Appendix A.2, in Tables A.2 and A.3, respec-
tively. From these data I construct a simple reduced-form measure of occupational
similarity OccSimih between industries i and h, namely, the correlation coefficient
between the industry-h vector of employment of each occupation (as a fraction of
industry h’s total employment) and the corresponding industry-i vector. OccCAimt
is then defined as
∑
hOccSimihCAimt.
Results
Table 2.1 reports the results of running regression (2.10) for each pair of decades
within the span of the data. The first result worth noting is that the within-industry
effect is always (with one exception) negative and significant − that is, if a country
has a larger comparative advantage in an industry, then on average its future growth
in comparative advantage in that industry is smaller.8 This finding is in line with
L&Z and HLM. As discussed in section 2.2.2, L&Z argue that this finding contradicts
the theory of learning-by-doing (at least at the industry level), but as demonstrated in
section 2.2.2, industry-level learning-by-doing is in fact consistent with this finding,
if the within-industry returns to learning are decreasing at a rate fast enough in
comparison with the size of the trade elasticity.
The second result worth noting in Table 2.1 is a significant and positive cross-
8The one exception is from the 1960’s to 1970’s, in which the within-industry effect is statistically
insignificant.
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industry effect, as a function of industries’ occupational similarity. That is, holding
fixed a country’s comparative advantage in industry i, if that country has a higher
comparative advantage in occupationally similar industries, then that country will on
average have higher future growth in its comparative advantage in industry i.
It is worth emphasizing that this is not simply regressing changes in comparative
advantage on concurrent changes in comparative advantage in occupationally simi-
lar industries, which could easily be explained by any arbitrary occupation-specific
shocks (e.g., shocks to occupation-specific education policy) that affect different in-
dustries to the extent they use those occupations. Instead, Table 2.1 is showing that
future changes in comparative advantage are positively related to previous levels of
comparative advantage in occupationally similar industries. This finding is suggestive
of significant dynamic occupation-based agglomeration economies, with occupational
learning being one possible mechanism behind this.
Table 2.1: Effect of the level of comparative advantage on growth in
comparative advantage (within industries and across industries, as a
function of their occupational similarity)
ln(CA 70
′s
CA 60′s ) ln(
CA 80′s
CA 70′s ) ln(
CA 90′s
CA 80′s ) ln(
CA 80′s
CA 60′s ) ln(
CA 90′s
CA 70′s ) ln(
CA 90′s
CA 60′s )
ln(CA 60’s) 0.0243 -0.859*** -0.249***
(0.0359) (0.0253) (0.0626)
ln(OccCA 60’s) 0.113** 0.139*** 0.233***
(0.0471) (0.0281) (0.0858)
ln(CA 70’s) -0.856*** -0.290***
(0.0201) (0.0455)
ln(OccCA 70’s) 0.103*** 0.181**
(0.0252) (0.0725)
ln(CA 80’s) -0.347***
(0.122)
ln(OccCA 80’s) 0.736***
(0.132)
Observations 880 880 880 880 880 880
R-squared 0.033 0.789 0.051 0.699 0.068 0.029
Note: each observation is at the country-by-industry level. CA t is country m’s comparative advantage in industry i
at date t, estimated following Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012). OccCA t is a weighted average of country
m’s date-t comparative advantage in every industry h other than industry i, with each industry h weighted by its
occupational similarity with industry i. All variables averaged by decade. Constant terms not reported in this table.
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country (44 countries). *** Significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10%
level.
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2.3 Quantitative analysis
The previous chapter showed how, in the presence of occupational learning-by-doing,
a country grows more when it has comparative advantages in industries that are
more central in the network of inter-industry occupational learning diffusion. In
the theoretical analysis of this chapter, I have shown how the size of a country’s
comparative advantage in an industry itself evolves over time as a function of the size
of different occupations in that country. This raises the question of how quantitatively
important is this occupation-based inter-industry network structure in explaining the
evolution of comparative advantage and the importance of different industries to
aggregate growth.
The key challenge in answering this question is in estimating the two key parame-
ters that govern the dynamics of the model, namely, ρ and σ − the rate of occupational
learning-by-doing, and the extent to which this learning spills over across industries,
respectively. I use the model-predicted dynamics of comparative advantage, as char-
acterized in section 2.2.1, to quantitatively discipline these two parameters. I describe
below the calibration of the static parameters of the model and the subsequent esti-
mation of the learning-by-doing parameters. I then use the calibrated model for two
quantitative exercises. First, I quantify the importance of learning-by-doing to the
dynamics of comparative advantage. Second, I assess how important each industry is
to aggregate growth − in particular, how much an increase in a country’s productivity
in an industry boosts that country’s equilibrium real income.
2.3.1 Calibration
In this section I describe the calibration of the static parameters of the model: the
intensity αij with which industry i uses occupation j, the industry-i exponent βi in
the representative household’s Cobb-Douglas utility function, the elasticity of substi-
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tution across occupations , the size of country m Lm, and the trade elasticity θ. The
calibration of these parameters is summarized in Table 2.2.
I calibrate αij using 2013 US data on each industry’s employment of each occupa-
tion from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For each industry i and occupation j, I set
αij equal to the number of people in occupation j that industry i employs, divided
by the total number of people that industry i employs.
Under the assumption that preferences are constant over time and across countries,
I calibrate βi using the 2012 Use Table from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
in the US. For each industry i, I set βi equal to personal consumption expenditures
on industry i divided by total personal consumption expenditures.
As described in Section 2.2.3, industries are classified at the 3-digit NAICS level,
while occupations are classified at the 2-digit Standard Occupational Classification
(SOC) level. The industries and occupations are reported in Appendix A.2, in Tables
A.2 and A.3, respectively.
To calibrate the size of each country, I use the World Development Indicators
(WDI) from the World Bank.9 Specifically, for each country m, I set Lm so that
wmLm equals country m’s GDP.
There is a substantial literature that provides a range of estimates of the trade
elasticity θ. I borrow the value 6.53 from CDK, as their trade model has the same
cross-sectional structure as mine, and they estimate the trade elasticity using data
from the same set of manufacturing industries as in this chapter. For the elasticity of
substitution across occupations, , I borrow the estimate 0.9 from Goos et al (2014),
which is also used by Lee (2017). Goos et al. estimate this elasticity off of the observed
correlation between the level of demand for an occupation within an industry and a
measure of industry marginal costs, using industry-occupation employment data at
9Taiwan is not included in the World Development Indicators, so for Taiwan I use the Monthly
Bulletin of Statistics of the Republic of China.
45
the same level of aggregation as this chapter.
Table 2.2: Summary of calibration of static parameters
Parameter Meaning Value Target / source
αij Occupation j’s weight in − US employment
industry i’s prod. fun. data (BLS)
βi Industry i’s weight − US output data
in utility function (BEA)
 Elasticity of substitution 0.9 Goos et al. (2014)
across occupations
Lm Size of country m − World Development
Indicators
θ Trade elasticity 6.53 CDK (2012)
2.3.2 Estimating learning-by-doing and quantifying its relevance to dy-
namics of comparative advantage
Following CDK, I estimate each country’s comparative advantage in each industry
for each time period. (See Section 2.2.1.) I jointly estimate the learning-by-doing
parameters ρ and σ to minimize the sum of squared errors between the model’s
predictions and the data, with regard to the moment condition from (2.4) linking
changes in comparative advantage to previous levels of employment − that is:
(ρˆ, σˆ) = argmin
ρ,σ
∑
i
∑
m
{εimt(ρ, σ)}2 (2.11)
where
εimt(ρ, σ) ≡ δi,m,t+1 − δimt − θ( 1
− 1) ln(
∑
j
(αij)
[(1 + L˜ijmt)
1−σ(1 + L˜jmt)σ]ρ(−1))
(2.12)
This estimation strategy exploits the fact that in the presence of occupational
learning-by-dong, a country’s change over time in its comparative advantage in an
industry is a weighted average of the size of each occupation in that country, both
within that industry and across other industries, with the weight on an occupation
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determined by how intensely that industry uses each occupation.
Note that this estimation strategy requires two different cross sections of trade
data. I average the export data into ten-year bins, estimating each country m’s
average comparative advantage in each industry i over ten-year periods, plugging
these estimates δimt into (2.12) in order to calibrate ρ and σ. Table 2.3 below shows
the resulting values of ρ and σ for each possible combination of pairs of time periods,
along with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.10
Table 2.3: Best-fit values of ρ and σ, and 95% confidence intervals
Time period ρ (rate of learning) σ (extent of inter-industry diffusion)
60’s to 70’s 12.5 0.74
[8.4, 18.1] [0.49, 1.02]
70’s to 80’s 10.4 0.96
[4.8, 14.6] [0.68, 1.97]
80’s to 90’s 10.2 0.72
[7.4, 16.7] [0.46, 1.08]
60’s to 80’s 10.8 0.93
[6.8, 14.7] [0.66, 1.50]
70’s to 90’s 10.9 0.78
[7.5, 15.1] [0.54, 1.10]
60’s to 90’s 10.7 0.81
[8.1, 15.4] [0.52, 1.08]
The estimates of ρ range from 10.2 to 12.5. A value of 12.5 for ρ means that a one
percentage point increase in the share of a country’s labor force in an occupation is
associated with a 12.5% higher productivity in that occupation in that country from
one decade to the next. Estimates of σ range from 0.72 to 0.96. A value of 0.74 for σ
means that 74% of occupational learning spills over across industries. The fact that,
in each of the above estimates, σ > 0.5 means that the occupational dimension to
learning is more important the industry dimension.
10Confidence intervals were obtained by randomly drawing a subsample of 22 countries and 10
industries, finding the ρˆ and σˆ that solve minimization problem (2.11) within this subsample of
countries and industries, and doing this 1000 times to obtain a distribution of 1000 values of ρˆ and
σˆ for each time period. The resulting histograms for ρˆ and σˆ for the 1960’s to 1970’s time period
are shown in Figures A·1 and A·2 in Appendix A.2. The histograms for the other time periods are
available upon request.
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How well does the calibrated model match the observed dynamics of comparative
advantage? Table 2.4 shows the correlation (“Corr”) between the calibrated model’s
predictions and the data, with regard to changes over time in comparative advantage
(that is, the correlation between the left-hand and right-hand sides of (2.4) given the
calibrated values of ρ and σ). This is shown for each possible time horizon, namely,
changes in comparative advantage over ten, twenty, and thirty years. The correlation
between the model’s predictions and the data is positive over each time horizon: 0.09
over a ten-year time horizon, 0.05 over twenty years, and 0.07 over thirty years.
For comparison, Table 2.4 also shows the corresponding correlation under the null
model, in which σ = 0, i.e., in which learning is only within-industry. (Under this null
model, I re-calibrate ρ so as to best fit the data under the condition σ = 0. The result-
ing value for ρ is also reported in Table 2.4.) The null model performs significantly
worse, meaning that learning-by-doing helps explain the dynamics of comparative
advantage significantly better when one accounts for inter-industry learning diffu-
sion. More precisely, by this metric, accounting for inter-industry learning diffusion
improves the fit of the model to the data by a factor of 4.5 when looking at changes
in comparative advantage from the 60’s to the 70’s, and even more so when looking
further out.
Table 2.4: Goodness of fit with regard to changes in comparative
advantage
60’s to 70’s 60’s to 80’s 60’s to 90’s
Best-fit ρ 12.5 10.8 10.7
Best-fit σ 0.74 0.93 0.81
Corr 0.09 0.05 0.07
ρ when σ = 0 19.1 18.0 16.8
Corr when σ = 0 0.02 -0.16 -0.04
Note that the method in this section for estimating ρ and σ targets the aver-
age extent of dynamic occupational agglomeration economies. Among the possible
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mechanisms that can generate such dynamics, learning-by-doing has received partic-
ularly heavy emphasis in prior literature (as surveyed in Acemoglu (2008), and as
discussed in Levchenko and Zhang (2016)), and hence is used to guide our think-
ing throughout this chapter. However, other possible mechanisms include dynamic
occupational economies of scale on the firms’ side − i.e., when a larger number of
people are employed in an occupation, employers better learn over time how to effi-
ciently hire and make use of this occupation. The estimation strategy in (2.11) is not
equipped to quantify the relative amounts of occupational learning-by-doing per se
vs. other sources of dynamic occupation-based agglomeration economies, but rather
it is intended to quantify the total importance of such occupation-based scale effects.
2.3.3 Quantifying each industry’s importance to aggregate growth
The theoretical analysis of the previous chapter showed how an industry contributes
more to aggregate growth when it is more central in the network of occupational
learning spillovers. The goal of this section is to quantify the size of this effect.
Consider a counterfactual 10% increase in a country m’s productivity in some
particular industry i, and hence an increase in m’s comparative advantage in indus-
try i. How much does this raise the country’s next-period real income? How does
this depend on the particular industry i? In this section I carry out this exercise for
each country and each industry in the sample − note that this is a separate counter-
factual exercise for each country and industry; i.e., this is not meant to capture any
interactions in the effects of shocks to different industries or countries.
As an illustration, Figure 2·1 plots the results for China, starting from the initial
equilibrium of the 1960’s. The dark blue bars in the graph show the equilibrium
increase in China’s GDP predicted by the calibrated model (with ρ = 12.5 and
σ = 0.74), while the light grey bars show the increase in the case of the null model
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without any inter-industry learning diffusion, i.e., with σ = 0 (still with ρ = 12.5).11
The ratio of the length of industry i’s dark blue bar to the length of its light grey
bar represents the extent to which industry i’s contribution to aggregate growth is
through the diffusion of learning in that industry into other industries, rather than
the direct effect of the increase in industry i’s productivity itself. Figure 2·2 plots the
average ratio for each industry, averaging across each of the countries in the sample.
Figure 2·1: Percent increase in China’s GDP, given 10% increase in
industry-i productivity
11Another natural benchmark is with no learning at all, i.e., with ρ = 0, the results of which
are plotted in Figure A·3 in Appendix A.2. The results are similar to the case in which σ = 0.
Given that the rate of learning ρ is the same for each industry, the main driver of asymmetries
across industries in their contribution to aggregate growth in this model is not learning in itself (i.e.,
ρ > 0), but rather the diffusion of occupational learning across industries (i.e., σ > 0) combined
with the asymmetries in how intensely each industry uses each occupation.
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Figure 2·2: Effect of industry-i productivity shock on GDP: average
ratio, calibrated model vs. only intra-industry learning
Note: this graph plots the geometric average (across each country m in the sample) of ↑GDPm(i)Null↑GDPm(i)
for each industry i, where ↑ GDPm(i) is the prediction of the calibrated model (with ρ = 12.5 and
σ = 0.74) for the percent increase in country m’s next-period real income, given a 10% increase in
country m’s productivity in industry i, while Null ↑ GDPm(i) is the corresponding prediction of
the null model with no inter-industry learning diffusion, i.e., with σ = 0.
We can get an intuitive sense of what drives the differences across industries in
Figures 2·1 and 2·2 by examining the diagrammatic representation of the occupation-
based network of industries in Figure 1·2 from the introduction of the previous chap-
ter. For industries that are highly central in the network, such as primary metals,
the null model with no inter-industry learning diffusion significantly understates their
contribution to aggregate growth. Meanwhile, for industries that are peripheral in
the network, such as petroleum and chemicals, an increase in productivity in these
industries − and hence an increase in the country’s comparative advantage in these
industries − draws workers into these industries and away from industries that gen-
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erate more inter-industry learning diffusion, meaning that the null model overstates
their contribution to aggregate growth.
More precisely, recall the result from Equation (1.12) that, as a first-order ap-
proximation, the total impact of the inter-industry learning spillovers generated by
an industry on a country’s aggregate real income is given by that industry’s Bonacich
centrality in the network of occupational learning diffusion.12 Table 2.5 below ranks
industries by their Bonacich centrality, and also ranks industries by the ratios reported
in Figure 2·2, i.e., by the model-predicted extent to which an industry’s contribution
to aggregate growth is through the diffusion of learning in that industry into other
industries.
The two rankings in Table 2.5 do not perfectly match, as Equation (1.12) is only
an approximation of the model derived in the special case of Leontief production,
but the two rankings have a significantly positive correlation of 0.43. Hence, the
intuitive notion of Bonacich centrality does a good job of capturing much of the
model-predicted variation in how much inter-industry learning diffusion each industry
generates.
The average discrepancy between the calibrated model and the model with no
inter-industry learning diffusion (i.e., the average length of the bars in Figure 2·2) is a
factor of 1.6, meaning that according to these estimates of the learning parameters, 1
1.6
(62%) of the average industry’s contribution to aggregate growth is through the direct
effect of growth in that industry itself. This means that according to these estimates,
a sizable fraction − 38% − of the average industry’s contribution to aggregate growth
is through the inter-industry learning spillovers that it generates.
12Table A.4 in Appendix A.2 reports each industry’s Bonacich centrality, as calculated using
Equation (1.12).
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Table 2.5: Industries ranked by amount of learning diffusion and by
their centrality
Industry Ranking by Inter-Industry Ranking by Bonacich
Learning Diffusion Centrality
Electrical Equipment 1 9
Transportation Equipment 2 11
Primary Metals 3 5
Textiles 4 2
Misc. Manufacturing 5 12
Paper 6 6
Machinery 7 7
Plastics 8 4
Apparel 9 1
Electronics 10 17
Fabricated Metals 11 3
Printing 12 8
Minerals 13 14
Food 14 13
Chemicals 15 16
Petroleum/Coal Products 16 15
Wood Products 17 10
Rank Correlation = 0.43
2.3.4 Effects of industry-specific trade policy
Given the learning externalities that underlie the model of this chapter, the decen-
tralized equilibrium of the model is not necessarily efficient. In particular, given the
diffusion across industries of occupational learning, there is a potential rationale for
governmental policy to prioritize industries that are more central in the network of
occupational learning diffusion.
Such prioritization could take many forms, such as industry-specific credit or
export subsidies. In this section I analyze the effects of tariff policy in particular.
Industry-specific tariffs are a policy lever that the model of this chapter explicitly
allows for, in the form of changes to the trade cost dimn parameters. The model is
rich enough to account for both the potential benefits of tariffs (namely, protection of
domestic production in strategic industries, i.e., industries that generate high amounts
of inter-industry learning diffusion), as well as the costs of tariffs (higher prices of
imported goods).
The aim of this section is to quantify the extent to which the relative costs and
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benefits of tariffs on different industries depend on how much learning diffusion each
industry generates. This is similar in spirit to Nunn and Trefler (2010), who provide
empirical evidence that a country’s aggregate growth is positively associated with the
“skill bias” of its tariffs − that is, the extent to which the country’s tariffs protect
high-skill industries rather than low-skill ones. In the model of this chapter, there
is no notion of asymmetry across industries with regard to being high- or low-skill,
but there is asymmetry with regard to how much occupational learning diffusion each
industry generates.
Consider a dramatic shift in some country m’s trade policy, in particular a shift
from free trade to a 100% tariff on all imported industry-i goods from all other
countries. How much does this affect country m’s next-period real income, and how
does this effect depend on the particular industry i? In this section I carry out this
exercise for each country and each industry in the sample. Note, as in the previous
section, that this is a separate counterfactual exercise for each country and industry;
i.e., this analysis does not examine possible interaction effects between these different
policy changes.
As an illustration, Figure 2·3 plots the results for the US, starting from the initial
equilibrium of the 1960’s. The dark blue bars in the graph show the resulting change
in the US’s next-period (i.e., 1970’s) real income predicted by the calibrated model
(with ρ = 12.5 and σ = 0.74), while the light grey bars show the change in the case
of the null model without any inter-industry learning diffusion, i.e., with σ = 0 (still
with ρ = 12.5).
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Figure 2·3: Percent change in US’s GDP, given movement from free
trade in industry i to 100% tariffs on all industry-i imports
The first thing to note from Figure 2·3 is that for each industry, the effects are
negative; i.e., the US’s GDP is less than it otherwise would be after placing each
of these tariffs. In principle, this need not be the case; as hinted at above, one
might expect that the benefits of a tariff could outweigh the costs if the industry
being protected generates large enough amounts of learning diffusion. Given that
this quantitative exercise is not considering all possible combinations of all possible
levels of tariffs in each industry, it does not necessarily follow from the negative results
in Figure 2·3 that the optimal trade policy under this model is free trade. Determining
each country’s optimal level of tariffs in each industry under this model remains an
interesting question for future research.
The second thing to note from Figure 2·3 is that for several of the industries, the
dark blue bars are significantly different in length from the light grey bars, i.e., the
effects of industry-specific tariffs on GDP significantly change when accounting for
55
the inter-industry learning diffusion generated by the industries being protected.
Consider, for example, the transportation equipment industry. Recall from the
previous section that this industry is highly central in the network of inter-industry
learning diffusion. Notice in Figure 2·3 that a tariff on this industry has a signifi-
cantly less negative impact on GDP when accounting for the learning diffusion that
it generates.
Contrast this with, for example, the petroleum industry, which, as shown in the
previous section, is peripheral in the network of learning diffusion. Figure 2·3 shows
that a petroleum tariff has an even more negative impact on the US’s GDP when
accounting for inter-industry learning diffusion. The reason is that protecting the
petroleum industry from foreign competition lowers the US’s real income not only
from the direct effect of higher petroleum prices, but also from the fact that it boosts
US production of petroleum, and hence US employment in the petroleum industry,
drawing workers into this industry and away form other industries that generate more
inter-industry learning diffusion.
In other words, the results in Figure 2·3 demonstrate that there is more of a
rationale for protecting the transportation equipment industry than the petroleum
industry, because the former generates more learning diffusion than the latter. But
again, note that even in the case of transportation equipment, the costs of the tariffs
(higher prices on transportation equipment) still outweigh the gains (an increase in
domestic transportation equipment production, and hence an increase in the amount
of learning diffusion from transportation equipment into other industries), at least
within the parameterization of this particular quantitative exercise.
The above discussion can be made more precise by calculating, for each industry,
the ratio of the length of the dark blue bar in Figure 2·3 to the ratio of the length
of the light grey bar. Figure 2·4 plots the average ratio for each industry, averaging
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across each of the countries in the sample. The lower this ratio, the more it is the
case that the effects of a tariff on that industry are less negative when accounting for
the learning diffusion generated by that industry.
Figure 2·4: Effect of industry-i trade shock on GDP: average ratio,
calibrated model vs. only intra-industry learning
Note: this graph plots the geometric average (across each country m in the sample) of ↓GDPm(i)Null↓GDPm(i)
for each industry i, where ↓ GDPm(i) is the prediction of the calibrated model (with ρ = 12.5 and
σ = 0.74) for the percent decrease in country m’s next-period real income, given a shift in country m
from free trade in industry i to a tariff of 100% on industry-i imports from all other countries, while
Null ↓ GDPm(i) is the corresponding prediction of the null model with no inter-industry learning
diffusion, i.e., with σ = 0.
Column 3 of Table 2.6 ranks industries by this ratio, with a ranking of “1”
corresponding to the lowest ratio. Table 2.6 compares this ranking with the two
previous rankings of industries from Table 2.5: that is, ranking industries by the
model-predicted extent to which an industry’s contribution to aggregate growth is
through inter-industry learning diffusion (Column 1), and ranking each industry by
its Bonacich centrality in the occupational similarity network (Column 2). The corre-
lation between Columns 1 and 3 is very high (0.7), meaning that the above discussion
− comparing the transportation equipment industry with the petroleum industry
− holds when comparing across industries more generallly. The correlation between
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Columns 2 and 3 is 0.42, which is similar to the correlation of 0.43 previously reported
in Table 2.5. Recall from the previous section that the correlation of 0.43 meant that
the simple measure of Bonacich centrality, while not perfect, is a good approximation
to the model’s predictions with regard to how much more an industry contributes
to aggregate growth when accounting for inter-industry learning diffusion. Similarly,
the correlation of 0.42 means that Bonacich centrality is a good approximation to the
model’s predictions with regard to how much the net effects of an industry-specific
tariff are less negative when accounting for the learning diffusion generated by that
industry.
Table 2.6: Industries ranked by learning diffusion, centrality, and
relative merits of protectionism
Industry (1) Ranking by (2) Ranking by (3) Ranking by
Inter-Industry Bonacich Relative Merit
Learning Diffusion Centrality of Protectionism
Electrical Equipment 1 9 6
Transportation Equipment 2 11 1
Primary Metals 3 5 5
Textiles 4 2 3
Misc. Manufacturing 5 12 7
Paper 6 6 12
Machinery 7 7 4
Plastics 8 4 2
Apparel 9 1 13
Electronics 10 17 17
Fabricated Metals 11 3 9
Printing 12 8 11
Minerals 13 14 8
Food 14 13 15
Chemicals 15 16 10
Petroleum/Coal Products 16 15 16
Wood Products 17 10 14
Rank Correlation between (1) and (2) = 0.43
Rank Correlation between (2) and (3) = 0.42
Rank Correlation between (1) and (3) = 0.70
2.4 Conclusions
This chapter provides a theoretical and quantitative characterization of the link be-
tween occupational learning-by-doing and the evolution of comparative advantage,
shedding new light on why the pattern of comparative advantage across countries
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and industries has changed over time. This chapter also shows that the theoretical
prediction from the previous chapter − that countries grow more in the aggregate
when they have a comparative advantage in industries that are more central in the
network of inter-industry occupational learning diffusion − is of quantitative signifi-
cance and has important implications for trade policy.
Although this chapter’s focus is on occupational learning at the country-industry
level, there is scope for future research at finer levels of aggregation. Employer-
employee matched data, for example, allow one to track the movement over time of
individual workers across firms and industries, as well as the variation over time in
firm-level productivity, allowing one to estimate how much workers’ previous knowhow
carries over to their new jobs, and to what extent their knowledge spills over to their
new coworkers and employers.
Moreover, this chapter focuses on one of possibly many components to learning,
in particular the occupational component, as occupations are a particularly salient
dimension through which productive knowledge can diffuse. However, there are other
potentially important channels of learning as well; for example, firms might learn over
time how to more efficiently use intermediate inputs. A quantitative examination
of the relative importance of these and other learning channels to the evolution of
comparative advantage is beyond the scope of this chapter, but is an important area
for future research.
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Chapter 3
Wait Your Turn: Sequential Episodes of
Industrialization
3.1 Introduction
At the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, one might have supposed that every country
in the world would immediately begin the process of industrialization, with every
country industrializing at roughly the same rate. But of course that is not what
happened. For the past few centuries, industrialization (defined for the sake of this
chapter as the movement of workers into the manufacturing sector) has largely moved
across countries in sequence rather than simultaneously, with Great Britain leading
the way in Europe, the US leading the way in the Americas, and Japan leading the
way in Asia, followed by the Four Asian Tigers and now China.1 Meanwhile, many
countries still have yet to industrialize.
In this chapter I show how a simple three-sector model of trade, growth, and
structural change can rationalize this pattern of industrialization happening across
countries largely in sequence rather than simultaneously. The key novel feature of the
model is a particular form of dynamic increasing returns to scale in the manufacturing
sector. In particular, manufacturing productivity evolves over time from learning-by-
doing, but this learning tapers off at high levels of productivity.
1Within the specific context of East Asia, this pattern of sequential industrialization has been
dubbed the flying geese pattern, a term first popularized by Akamatsu (1962). For a detailed account
of the timing of industrialization across countries, see Bentzen, Kaarsen, and Wingender (2013).
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I embed this form of learning-by-doing into the Uy, Yi, and Zhang (2013) (hence-
forth “UYZ”) open-economy model of structural change. The UYZ model is a three-
sector extension of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) (henceforth “EK”) multi-country
Ricardian model of trade. The EK structure allows for a country’s productivity in a
sector to be characterized not just by a single number but by an entire distribution;
thus, as a country’s productivity in a sector changes, its allocation of workers and
output across sectors changes in a smooth way. For the purposes of this chapter, this
allows one to analyze how industrialization gradually moves across countries. The
UYZ model allows for non-homothetic preferences, an important factor underpinning
the pattern of industrialization and later deindustrialization over the course of a coun-
try’s development. In particular, as a country’s income increases, the model allows
its demand to shift from agriculture to manufacturing to services.
The reason that my particular formulation of dynamic increasing returns to scale
in manufacturing can induce a sequential pattern of industrialization is as follows.
Imagine comparing two countries, both of which have yet to industrialize (i.e., their
labor force is in agriculture), and one of these countries has a slightly higher initial
productivity in manufacturing than the other. The country that is initially more
productive in manufacturing will produce slightly more manufacturing, due to having
a slightly higher comparative advantage in it. Due to learning-by-doing, this country’s
productivity (and hence their comparative advantage) in manufacturing will further
increase, after which they will produce even more manufacturing, and so on.
But eventually, at high enough levels of manufacturing productivity, learning ta-
pers off. At this point, even at low levels of manufacturing output, the more backward
country begins to learn relatively more than the more advanced country; the more
backward country’s comparative advantage in manufacturing thereby increases and
the more advanced country’s decreases. The more backward country then starts to
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industrialize (in the same way that the more advanced country previously did) while
the more advanced country begins to deindustrialize (i.e., its workers move into the
services sector). Hence, even though the two countries started off with only slightly
different initial conditions, they do not industrialize in tandem. Instead, the slightly
initially more backward country has to “wait its turn” for the other country to in-
dustrialize first.
In addition to a sequential pattern of industrialization across countries, another
noteworthy result of my model is that the peak manufacturing share of employment
is lower for countries that industrialize later. This is consistent with what is observed
in the data by Rodrik (2015), who calls this finding premature deindustrialization.
Rodrik emphasizes the potentially negative implications of this finding for economic
growth and inequality, since manufacturing has historically been a large source of
technological innovation, as well as employment of lower-income workers. The rea-
son such premature deindustrialization happens in my model is that countries that
industrialize later are industrializing at a time when the world income is higher −
which, due to non-homothetic preferences, means world demand is less concentrated
in manufacturing and more in services.
This chapter contributes to a body of theoretical literature that offers purely
economic explanations − i.e., without recourse to differences in countries’ policies
or institutions − for why industrialization episodes (and related variables, like high
rates of growth and technological progress) tend to move from country to country
sequentially rather than simultaneously.
Nakajima (2003) develops a model of trade and growth featuring both learning-
by-doing and invention of new goods. Learning-by-doing acts in his model as a force
of divergence of income levels across countries, while invention of new goods acts as
a force of convergence, since the pace of invention is a binding constraint on the rate
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of growth for rich countries but not poor ones. He shows how the equilibrium path
of his model can involve one country growing rapidly and then slowing down while
another country starts growing rapidly. The theoretical analysis of his paper is similar
in spirit to mine; however, his model does not involve a sectoral dimension, and hence
his focus is on aggregate growth, while in this chapter I use a three-sector model in
order to investigate the sequencing of industrialization episodes across countries.
Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993) theoretically analyze the related concept
of leapfrogging, referring to the case in which a previously technologically backward
country not only catches up with a more advanced country but goes on to actually
surpass it. Their two-country model involves both gradual learning-by-doing within
a given technology, and the introduction of new technologies that have no relation
to old ones. When a country has an initial advantage over another country in some
particular technology, this advantage accumulates over time from learning-by-doing.
However, when a new technology is introduced, it is adopted in the poorer country
first, because the opportunity cost is lower for them to do so. But eventually the
new technology (which, by assumption, has more growth potential than the previous
technology) surpasses the old one in productivity and hence the previously poorer
country is now the richer country. Comin and Hobijn (2004) empirically examine the
adoption of technologies across countries; they test the theory of Brezis, Krugman,
and Tsiddon (among others) and reject it; they find that new technologies tend to be
adopted first by richer countries, not poorer ones.
Arguably the paper most closely related to this chapter is Puga and Venables
(1996). Building on the core-periphery models of Krugman (1991) and Krugman and
Venables (1995), they develop a two-country, two-sector (agriculture and manufac-
turing) model in which input-output linkages between monopolistically competitive
firms induce pecuniary externalities that act as a force of agglomeration in the manu-
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facturing sector. They consider the case in which manufacturing is initially present in
only one of the two countries, and then examine the effect of an exogenous symmetric
increase in the labor productivity of both countries. Since agriculture in their model
uses both land and labor while manufacturing only uses labor, this shock increases
demand for manufacturing relative to agriculture. This increases the equilibrium
wage of the country in which manufacturing is agglomerated relative to the wage
in the other country. This causes a few manufacturing firms to move to the other
country, to save on labor costs. But given the input-output linkages that act as a
force of agglomeration, other firms move as well, until a critical mass is reached and
manufacturing moves into the other country in dramatic fashion. Given the focus
of their paper on capturing as simply as possible the tension between agglomeration
forces and wage differences, they simply take the increase in labor productivity as ex-
ogenous. In this chapter, I endogenize productivity growth in manufacturing through
learning-by-doing, which also, in and of itself, acts as force of agglomeration.
More broadly, this chapter contributes to the literature on structural change in
open economies. See Section 6.1 of Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013)
for a survey of this area. Of particular note for my purposes is Ungor (2012), who
studies the impact of the industrialization of China on the deindustrialization of the
US between 1978 and 2005. He finds that his open economy model accounts for 63
percent of the fall in the US’s share of employment in manufacturing, compared to
only 33 percent being explained by a closed economy model. This empirical result is
consistent with the theory of this chapter that industrialization of one country tends
to coincide with deindustrialization of another, rather than the two being independent
of each other.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 I introduce the
model. In section 3.3 I numerically simulate the model to show how it is capable of
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generating a sequential pattern of industrialization. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Model
The trade structure of the model in this section follows Uy, Yi, and Zhang (2013).
Growth in the model arises from learning-by-doing in the manufacturing sector. While
returns to scale are constant at each date t, the learning-by-doing induces dynamic
increasing returns to scale, whereby a country’s growth in productivity in manufactur-
ing is an increasing function of the share of its labor force working in manufacturing.
However, this learning tapers off at higher levels of productivity.
Time in the model is discrete and is indexed by t. The world economy is composed
of N countries. At each date, each country i is exogenously endowed with Li units of
labor; labor is immobile across countries but is freely mobile across sectors within a
country. The economy is composed of three sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and
services, denoted by A, M , and S, respectively. Within each sector there is a unit
continuum of goods, with an individual good denoted by z ∈ [0, 1].
3.2.1 Production
At each date t, given the wage wit in country i and the price pikt(z) of good z in
sector k in country i, the good-z-producing firm in sector k in country i chooses labor
Likt(z) in order to maximize profits
pikt(z)Yikt(z)− witLikt(z) (3.1)
where Yikt(z) is output, produced according to the production function
Yikt(z) = Aikt(z)Likt(z) (3.2)
where Aikt(z) is total factor productivity in good z, sector k, country i, at date
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t. Aikt(z) is the realization of a random variable drawn from a Fre´chet distribution
with CDF
Fikt(A) = e
−TiktA−θ (3.3)
Note that the higher Tikt is, the greater country i’s mean productivity is in sector
k at date t, while the higher θ is, the lower the variance of a country’s productivity
is within a sector.
3.2.2 Market structure
Once a good is produced in a country, it can be consumed in that country or exported
to a different country, subject to iceberg trade costs. That is, if one unit of a good
in sector k is shipped from country j to country i, then 1
τijk
units arrive in country i.
Trade is assumed to be costless within countries; that is, τiik = 1 for each country i
and sector k. The standard triangle inequality is assumed to hold; that is, for each
sector k and each triplet of countries i, j, and m, τijk ≤ τmjkτimk.
The cost of producing good z in sector k in country j and supplying it to country
i at date t is therefore
pijkt(z) =
τijkwjt
Ajkt(z)
(3.4)
Markets are perfectly competitive. Consumers in each country i purchase each
good from whichever country can supply the good to country i most cheaply. Hence
the price in country i of good z in sector k at date t is
pikt(z) = min
j
{pijkt(z)} (3.5)
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3.2.3 Preferences
Consumers have Stone-Geary preferences. The utility function of the representative
consumer in country i is
U(CiAt, CiMt, CiSt) = (CiAt − CA)βA(CiMt)1−βA−βS(CiSt + CS)βS (3.6)
where Cikt is country i’s consumption at date t of the sector-k composite good
(defined below), CA ≥ 0 is an agricultural subsistence requirement, and CS ≥ 0 is
the value of non-market services (e.g., cooking performed within households rather
than restaurants). Due to the presence of CA and CS in (3.6), preferences are non-
homothetic. In particular, the income elasticity of demand for agricultural goods is
less than one, and the income elasticity of demand for services is greater than one.
At each date t, the country-i representative consumer maximizes utility (3.6)
subject to the budget constraint
PiAtCiAt + PiMtCiMt + PiStCiSt = wit (3.7)
where Pikt is the price of the sector-k composite good (defined below) in country
i at date t. Consumers have CES preferences over the continuum of goods within
each sector; that is, country-i consumption of the sector-k composite good at date t
is equal to
Cikt = (
1∫
0
Cikt(z)
η−1
η dz)
η
η−1 (3.8)
where η is the elasticity of substitution across the continuum of goods within a
sector.
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3.2.4 Prices, trade shares, and date-t equilibrium
As shown by Eaton and Kortum (2002), given the assumption (3.3) that productivities
are drawn from a Fre´chet distribution, the price of the sector-k composite good in
country i at date t is equal to
Pikt = Γ(Φikt)
− 1
θ (3.9)
where Γ is the gamma function evaluated at (1 − η−1
θ
)
1
1−η and where Φikt =∑
j Tjkt(wjtτijk)
−θ captures country i’s access to global production in sector k at
date t. It follows, then, that the share of country i’s date-t expenditure on sector k
that is sourced by country j equals country i’s probability of importing a sector-k
good from country j at date t, which equals
piijkt =
Tjkt(wjtτijk)
−θ
Φikt
(3.10)
Definition Given country sizes {Li}i, productivity parameters θ and {Tikt}i,k, trade
costs {τijk}i,j,k, and preference parameters βA, βS, CA, and CS, a date-t competitive
equilibrium of this economy is a set of prices {Pikt}i,k, wages {wit}i, and allocations
{Yikt, Likt, Cikt}i,k such that
1. Firms maximize profits (3.1) subject to their production technology (3.2).
2. Consumers maximize utility (3.6) subject to their budget constraint (3.7).
3. Markets clear − that is, for each country i:
LiAt + LiMt + LiSt = Li (3.11)
There is no closed-form solution for this equilibrium, but it can be computed using
an algorithm analogous to the one from Section (1.3.1).
68
3.2.5 Evolution of manufacturing productivity from learning-by-doing
Productivity in manufacturing evolves over time from learning-by-doing:
Ti,M,t+1
TiMt
=

(1 + L˜iMt)
ρ if TiMt < TM
1 otherwise
(3.12)
where L˜iMt is the share of country i’s labor force in manufacturing at date t,
ρ is the elasticity of learning in manufacturing with respect to manufacturing labor
usage, and TM is an upper bound on a country’s productivity in manufacturing. Each
country’s initial productivity in manufacturing at date 0 Ti,M,0 is exogenously given.
Note that this learning is external to individual agents; hence, when firms, workers,
and consumers make their decisions, they do not take into account the effects of
their actions on each country’s future productivity in manufacturing. Given this
assumption, which is made for tractability, the equilibrium path of the model can be
derived by computing the equilibrium at each date t given date-t productivities, with
productivities evolving from one period to the next according to equation (3.12).
The particular formulation of learning-by-doing in equation (3.12) has three key
features. First, as in Young (1993), learning tapers off at high levels of productivity,
empirical support for which is documented in Thompson (2010). For the sake of
simplicity, this tapering off is modeled in the starkest possible way, namely, a hard
upper bound TM on manufacturing productivity. This formulation can easily be
generalized to allow for a more gradual tapering off of learning; the key is that learning
at high levels of productivity is less than at low levels.
Second, learning is localized. Again for the sake of simplicity, I make this assump-
tion in the most extreme possible way, namely, learning externalities are entirely
within countries. This can be generalized to allow for international learning diffusion;
the key is that at least some learning is localized, so that a country’s growth in man-
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ufacturing productivity is a function of its own share of manufacturing employment.
Third, given the focus of this chapter on industrialization, in order to cleanly iso-
late the mechanism of learning-by-doing in manufacturing, equation (3.12) is manufacturing-
specific; that is, the model does not feature any learning-by-doing in agriculture or
services. At each date t, TiAt and TiSt are exogenously given for each country i.
3.3 Numerical simulation
In this section I simulate the model from section 3.2 to show how the model can
induce a sequential pattern of industrialization across countries.
3.3.1 Parameterization of the model
The model of section 3.2 allows for any number N of countries, but consider in this
section the case of N = 3, as the case of three countries is the case that most clearly
illustrates the key mechanisms of the theory.
For simplicity, consider the case in which the three countries are equally sized, in
which case the size of the labor force of each country i Li can be normalized to 1.
Also for simplicity, consider the case in which the countries are equally productive in
agriculture and services; let TiAt = TiSt = 10 for each country i at each date t.
The only variation, then, across countries is in their initial productivity in man-
ufacturing. In this simulation, I set country 1’s initial manufacturing productivity
equal to 20 (that is, T1,M,0 = 20), country 2’s initial manufacturing productivity
equal to 11, and country 3’s equal to 9. Country 1 thus represents a country with a
significant initial comparative advantage in manufacturing, whiles countries 2 and 3
represent countries that are initially backward in manufacturing. Country 2 has an
initial advantage in manufacturing over country 3, but only slightly.
One might think, then, that the share of country 1’s labor force in manufacturing
each period will be significantly different from countries 2 and 3, while countries 2
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and 3 ought to be similar to each other each period. The point of this section is to
show that that is not the case; the model is capable of generating a sequential pattern
of industrialization, whereby country 2 industrializes as country 1 de-industrializes,
but country 3 is left behind and has to “wait its turn” to industrialize after country
2, even though countries 2 and 3 started off with similar initial conditions.
The key assumptions that generate sequentiality of industrialization are that
preferences are non-homothetic (i.e., CA > 0 and CS > 0, with 0 < βA < 1 and
0 < βS < 1), and there is bounded learning-by-doing in manufacturing (i.e., ρ > 0
and 0 < TM < ∞). For the sake of this simulation, to capture non-homotheticity
of preferences, I set CS = 1 and CA = 0.5, and βS = 0.5 and βA = 0.2. To cap-
ture bounded learning-by-doing in manufacturing, I set ρ = 0.4 and TM = 1000. To
capture services being less tradable than agricultural and manufacturing goods, I set
τijA = τijM = 1 while τijS = 1.5.
The only parameters left to set are the elasticity of substitution η across goods
within a sector and the parameter θ governing the dispersion of productivity within
a sector. As shown by Eaton and Kortum (2002), η does not affect equilibrium prices
or quantities at the sector level; I arbitrarily set it to 3. I set θ equal to 5, which is
within the range of estimates of θ in the quantitative Ricardian trade literature (as
summarized by Eaton and Kortum (2012)).
The parameter choices described above are summarized in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Parameter choices for numerical simulation
Parameter Meaning Value
Li size of labor force in each country 1
τijA and τijM trade costs in agriculture and manufacturing 1.0
τijS trade costs in services (for i 6= j) 1.5
θ within-sector variance of productivity 5
η within-sector elasticity of substitution 3
CA agricultural subsistence requirement 0.5
CS value of household/non-market services 1.0
βA agricultural exponent in utility function 0.2
βS services exponent in utility function 0.5
TiA agricultural productivity in each country 10
TiS services productivity in each country 10
T1,M,0 initial manufacturing productivity in country 1 20
T2,M,0 initial manufacturing productivity in country 2 11
T3,M,0 initial manufacturing productivity in country 3 9
ρ rate of learning-by-doing in manufacturing 0.4
TM upper bound on manufacturing productivity 1000
3.3.2 Simulation results
Given the parameterization of the model detailed in section 3.3.1, I simulate the model
for 75 periods. Figure 3·1 plots the equilibrium share of each country’s labor force
in manufacturing each period. As one can see in the figure, under these parametric
assumptions, the model generates a sequential pattern of industrialization, whereby
country 1 industrializes first, then country 2, and finally country 3.
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Figure 3·1: The share of each country’s labor force in manufacturing,
each period
The explanation for why the model generates this sequencing of industrialization
episodes is as follows. Let phase 1 denote the range of time during which country 1 is
industrializing, and likewise for phase 2 and phase 3. Let phase 4 denote the range of
time during which every country has reached a steady state level of industrialization.
As can be seen in figure 3·1, under these values of the model’s parameters, phase 1
constitutes periods 1 through 23, phase 2 constitutes periods 23 through 40, phase 3
constitutes periods 40 through 64, and phase 4 constitutes periods 64 onwards.
During phase 1, country 1’s initial comparative advantage in manufacturing in-
tensifies over time relative to countries 2 and 3, due to learning-by-doing in manu-
facturing (i.e., due to the fact that ρ > 0). Since country 1 has a significantly larger
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initial comparative advantage in manufacturing, they produce more manufactured
goods than countries 2 and 3. Due to learning-by-doing, country 1’s productivity in
manufacturing therefore increases more than country 2’s or 3’s. Country 1’s compar-
ative advantage in manufacturing thereby grows, and hence in equilibrium a larger
and larger share of country 1’s labor force is employed in manufacturing, whereas the
opposite is true for countries 2 and 3.
This process continues until country 1’s productivity in manufacturing reaches the
upper bound TM , which marks the start of phase 2. Note that, compared to country
3, country 2 has a larger comparative advantage in manufacturing and therefore pro-
duces more manufactured goods. Country 2’s productivity in manufacturing therefore
increases more than country 3’s, due to learning-by-doing. Meanwhile, country 1’s
productivity in manufacturing remains flat at TM . Thus country 2’s comparative
advantage in manufacturing increases, and hence the equilibrium share of country
2’s labor force in manufacturing increases, while the share of country 1’s labor force
in manufacturing decreases. That is, country 2 industrializes while country 3 is left
behind, and country 1 de-industrializes.
Phase 3 begins when country 2’s productivity in manufacturing reaches the upper
bound TM . At this point, country 3’s productivity in manufacturing increases over
time from learning-by-doing, while country 1’s and 2’s productivity in manufacturing
remains flat at TM . Country 3’s comparative advantage in manufacturing therefore
increases relative to countries 1 and 2. The equilibrium share of the labor force in
manufacturing thus increases in country 3, while it decreases in countries 1 and 2.
That is, country 3 industrializes while countries 1 and 2 de-industrialize.
This continues until every country’s productivity in manufacturing has reached
TM , which marks the fourth and final phase. From then on, the share of each country’s
labor force in manufacturing remains flat at the same steady state level.
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In addition to industrialization happening sequentially across countries, another
important result of the model that can be seen in Figure 3·1 is that country 2’s peak
manufacturing share of employment is lower than country 1’s peak share, and like-
wise, country 3’s peak share is lower than country 2’s. This is consistent with the
recent empirical finding that countries that industrialize later tend to never reach as
high of a manufacturing share of employment as countries that industrialized earlier
on, a stylized fact that Rodrik (2015) has termed “premature deindustrialization.”
As Rodrik notes, to the extent that the manufacturing sector is an important source
of productivity growth, as well as an important source of employment for low-skill
workers, this premature deindustrialization has potentially significant negative rami-
fications for economic growth and inequality.
The reason the model generates this pattern of premature deindustrialization has
to do with non-homothetic preferences. When country 2 reaches its peak share of
manufacturing employment, the real income of the representative consumer of each
country is higher than when country 1 reached its peak share of manufacturing em-
ployment. Given the Stone-Geary preferences in (3.6), wealthier consumers demand
services more than manufactured goods. Hence, when country 2 reaches its peak
share of manufacturing employment, global demand for manufactured goods (relative
to demand for services) is less than when country 1 reached its peak share, and thus
country 2’s peak share is lower than country 1’s. The same logic also holds when
comparing country 3 with country 2.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter offers a novel rationale for why there is a high degree of sequentiality
of industrialization episodes across countries, rather than industrialization occurring
evenly across many countries at once.
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In the particular parameterization of the model analyzed in this chapter, the
model predicts a particularly extreme form of sequentiality, in which only one country
industrializes at a time. There are two natural extensions to the analysis that can
temper the starkness of this prediction. The first is to let trade costs be asymmetric
across country pairs, in which case two countries can industrialize simultaneously,
even if one is significantly more productive than the other in manufacturing − in
particular, if the less productive country has lower trade costs with other countries
that have a high amount of demand for manufactured goods. The second is to extend
the model to allow for multiple subsectors within the manufacturing sector. Then,
to the extent that learning-by-doing in manufacturing is subsector-specific, countries
can industrialize simultaneously in different subsectors.
An important goal for future research is to use these extensions to the analysis,
along with data on the evolution of sectoral productivities and employment shares
across different countries over time, in order to quantify the degree of sequentiality
of industrialization episodes across countries.
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Appendix A
Derivations, tables, and figures
A.1 Derivation of theoretical results
A.1.1 Derivation of Equation 1.11
We will log-linearize around the symmetric case in which, at some date t, all occu-
pational productivities are the same and production is equal across industries, that
is, φjt = φkt ∀j, k and Yit = Yht ∀i, h. Combining the equilibrium equations (1.7)
through (1.10) (with Cobb-Douglas utility and Leontief production, i.e., γ → 1 and
→ 0), we have
log(Yh,t+1) ≈ log(βhLt+1)−
∑
j
αhjlog(φjt)
+ ρ
∑
j
αhjlog(
∑
i
αij) + ρ
∑
j
αhj
∑
i
(
αij∑
m αmj
)log(Yit)
− ρ
∑
j
αhjlog(I)− ρ
∑
j
αhj
∑
i
(
1
I
)log(Yit) (A.1)
By taking the derivative of (A.1) with respect to log(Yit), we see that a 1% increase
in Yit causes approximately an Aih% increase in Yh,t+1, where
Aih ≡ ρ
∑
j
αhj(
αij∑
m αmj
− 1
I
) (A.2)
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A.1.2 Derivation of Equation 1.12
Consider an arbitrary equilibrium path {Y ?it}i,t and corresponding {U?t }t. Suppose,
starting from this equilibrium path, we increase Yit by 1% for some industry i at some
date t. Let us now calculate the effect that this has on the total discounted utility of
the representative household from date t onward.
Let lowercase letters denote log-deviations from the previous equilibrium path.
Specifically, let yit ≡ log(Yit)− log(Y ?it ) and ut ≡ log(Ut)− log(U?t ). Let ~yt denote the
I-dimensional vector specifying yit for each industry i. Let u denote the discounted
sum of log-deviations in utility over time, i.e., let u ≡∑t δtut, where 0 < δ < 1 is the
representative household’s discount factor. Let β denote the I-dimensional vector
specifying the industry-i exponent in the representative household’s Cobb-Douglas
utility function, and let I denote the IxI identity matrix.
Using the approximation from above that a 1% increase in Yit causes an Aih%
increase in Yh,t+1, where Aih is defined by (A.2), then if we let A denote the IxI
matrix whose (i, h) element is Aih, then ~yt+1 ≈ A~yt. Let us now calculate dud~yt , which is
the I-dimensional vector whose ith element gives the total discounted sum of percent
increases in the representative household’s utility from a 1% increase in Yit:
du
d~yt
≈ β + δAβ + δ2A2β + δ3A3β + . . .
= β + δ(I + δA+ δ2A2 + . . . )Aβ
= β + δ(I− δA)−1Aβ (A.3)
The right-hand side of (A.3) is the I-dimensional vector whose ith element is the
Bonacich centrality of industry i in the network of industries, with each industry i
weighted by its exponent βi in the representative household’s Cobb-Douglas utility
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function.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2.1
Combining equations (1.25) and (2.3), we have, at date t+ 1,
e
δi,m,t+1
θ = zim{
∑
j
(αij)
(φijmt[(1 + L˜ijmt)
1−σ(1 + ˜˜Ljmt)σ]ρ)−1} 1−1 (A.4)
Given the log-linearity of the learning-by-doing equation1, we can normalize φijmt
to 1 for every industry-i-occupation-j-country-m. We then have, at date t,
e
δimt
θ = zim (A.5)
while at date t+ 1 we have
e
δi,m,t+1
θ = zim{
∑
j
(αij)
[(1 + L˜ijmt)
1−σ(1 + ˜˜Ljmt)σ]ρ(−1)} 1−1 (A.6)
Dividing equation (A.6) by equation (A.5) and taking logs on both sides2, we have
our result:
δi,m,t+1 − δimt = θ( 1
− 1) ln{
∑
j
(αij)
[(1 + L˜ijmt)
1−σ(1 + ˜˜Ljmt)σ]ρ(−1)} (A.7)
This proves the proposition. 
1That is, given the fact that, for any given specification of date-t labor usage in each industry
and occupation, the percent change in productivity from date t to t+ 1 from learning-by-doing does
not depend on the date-t level of producivity φijmt.
2Note that I am assuming here that zim − the parameter governing country m’s average TFP in
industry i − does not change over time. For the purpose of this characterization of the link between
learning-by-doing and dynamics of comparative advantage, this assumption is WLOG: suppose, to
the contrary, that zim were changing over time, and suppose, to take the most extreme example,
that φijmt were not changing over time. This would be isomorphic to zim staying the same over
time while φijmt changes, with φijmt changing at the same rate for each occupation within each
industry.
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A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2.2.2
A change in CAimt changes CAi,m,t+1 through zimt’s effect (via learning-by-doing) on
zi,m,t+1, which operates both directly and via changes in yimt. Formally,
d ln(CAi,m,t+1)
d ln(CAimt)
=
d ln(zimt)
d ln(CAimt)
(
d ln(zi,m,t+1)
d ln(zimt)
d ln(CAi,m,t+1)
d ln(zi,m,t+1)
+
d ln(yimt)
d ln(zimt)
d ln(zi,m,t+1)
d ln(yimt)
d ln(CAi,m,t+1)
d ln(zi,m,t+1)
) (A.8)
We will compute each of these derivatives in turn. In order to do so, first note
that, under the simplifying assumptions made in Section ??3, the equilibrium value
(in quantity terms) of country m’s total production of industry i at date t is equal to
yimt = (
1
I
)
(wmt)
−θ−1(zimt)θ+1∑N
m′=1(wm′t)
−θ(zim′t)θ
(A.9)
Taking a first-order log-linear approximation of yimt:
ln(yimt) ≈ ln(1
I
) + (−θ − 1) ln(wmt) + (θ + 1) ln(zimt)− ln(N)+
N∑
m′=1
(
1
N
)[θ ln(wm′t)− θ ln(zim′t)] (A.10)
And a first-order log-linear approximation of country m’s equilibrium wage4 is
3Recall that these simplifying assumptions are that trade costs are zero, the size of the labor
force in each country is equal to 1, and each country’s representative household’s utility function
puts equal weight on each industry.
4The derivation of this approximation is available upon request. This expression for the equi-
librium wage holds exactly in the case of complete symmetry across countries and industries (and,
as mentioned above, zero trade costs), but only holds as a first-order approximation outside of it.
In the case of only one industry, this reduces to the closed-form solution to the Eaton and Kortum
(2002) model with zero trade costs provided by Alvarez and Lucas (2007).
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ln(wmt) ≈ ( 1
1 + θ
) ln(I) + (
1
1 + θ
)
I∑
i=1
(
1
I
)θ ln(zimt) (A.11)
We are now ready to compute the derivatives in equation (A.8). From the defini-
tion of comparative advantage (equation (2.6)), we have
d ln(zimt)
d ln(CAimt)
=
d ln(CAi,m,t+1)
d ln(zi,m,t+1)
= 1 (A.12)
From the learning-by-doing equation (equation (2.5)) we have
d ln(zi,m,t+1)
d ln(zimt)
= 1 (A.13)
and
d ln(zi,m,t+1)
d ln(yimt)
= ρ (A.14)
From equation (A.10) we have
d ln(yimt)
d ln(zimt)
≈ (1 + θ)(1− d ln(wmt)
d ln(zimt)
) (A.15)
From equation (A.11) we have
d ln(wmt)
d ln(zimt)
≈ (1
I
)(
θ
1 + θ
) (A.16)
Combining equations (A.12), (A.13), (A.14), (A.15), and (A.16) gives us
d ln(CAi,m,t+1)
d ln(CAimt)
≈ 1 + ρ(1 + [I − 1
I
]θ) (A.17)
This proves the proposition. 
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A.2 Tables and figures
Table A.1: List of countries in sample
Morocco Malaysia
Tunisia Pakistan
Nigeria Philippines
Canada Singapore
USA Thailand
Argentina Taiwan
Brazil Belgium and Luxembourg
Chile Denmark
Colombia France and Monaco
Ecuador Greece
Mexico Ireland
Peru Italy
Venezuela Netherlands
Israel Portugal
Japan Spain
Turkey UK
China, Hong Kong, and S.A.R.’s Norway
South Korea Sweden
Switzerland and Lichtenstein
Table A.2: List of industries in sample
NAICS Industry NAICS Industry
311 Food Manufacturing 325 Chemical Manufacturing
312 Beverages and Tobacco Products 326 Plastics and Rubber Products
313 Textile Mills 327 Nonmetallic Mineral Products
314 Textile Product Mills 331 Primary Metal Manufacturing
315 Apparel Manufacturing 332 Fabricated Metal Products
316 Leather and Allied Products 333 Machinery
321 Wood Products 334 Computers and Electronic Products
322 Paper Manufacturing 335 Electrical Equipment and Appliances
323 Printing and Related Activities 336 Transportation Equipment
324 Petroleum and Coal Products 339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing
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Table A.3: List of occupations in sample
SOC code Occupation
11 Management Occupations
13 Business and Financial Operations Occupations
15 Computer and Mathematical Occupations
17 Architecture and Engineering Occupations
19 Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations
21 Community and Social Services Occupations
23 Legal Occupations
25 Education, Training, and Library Occupations
27 Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations
29 Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations
31 Healthcare Support Occupations
33 Protective Service Occupations
35 Food Preparation and Serving Related Occupations
37 Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations
39 Personal Care and Service Occupations
41 Sales and Related Occupations
43 Office and Administrative Support Occupations
45 Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations
47 Construction and Extraction Occupations
49 Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations
51 Production Occupations
53 Transportation and Material Moving Occupations
Histogram of ρˆ across subsamples of countries and industries
Figure A·1: This graph plots the distribution of the ρˆ that solves minimization
problem (2.11), across 1000 random subsamples of 22 countries and 10 industries,
for the time period 1960’s to 1970’s.
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Histogram of σˆ across subsamples of countries and industries
Figure A·2: This graph plots the distribution of the σˆ that solves minimization
problem (2.11), across 1000 random subsamples of 22 countries and 10 industries,
for the time period 1960’s to 1970’s.
Figure A·3: Percent increase in China’s GDP, given 10% increase in
industry-i productivity.
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Table A.4: Bonacich centrality of each industry in network of occu-
pational learning diffusion
Industry Bonacich Centrality
Electrical Equipment 2.03
Transportation Equipment 2.03
Primary Metals 2.12
Textiles 2.22
Misc. Manufacturing 2.02
Paper 2.07
Machinery 2.04
Plastics 2.16
Apparel 2.25
Electronics 1.63
Fabricated Metals 2.17
Printing 2.04
Minerals 1.86
Food 1.87
Chemicals 1.83
Petroleum/Coal Products 1.85
Wood Products 2.03
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